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Chapter I 
Introduction 
The Federal Reserve Act, passed December 23, 1913, 
was undoubtedly the greatest single piece of banking 
legislation ever enacted. Coming after years of inves-
tigation by specialists, months of deliberation by leg-
islators and after a nation-wide campaign for theed-
ucation of the public, this act contained features bor-
rowed from practically every great banking system of 
the world, as well as features absolutely unique and 
designed to adapt the European central bank idea to the 
particular needs and psychology of the American public. 
At the time of the establishment of the Federal 
Reserve system no one could accurately forsee its wide-
sweeping consequences nor predict its influences. As 
compared with the act itself the first three years of 
the existence of the system were not spectacular nor 
such as destined to fire the imagination of either the 
public or the bankers. The entrance of the United 
States into the war and the attendant demands on the 
banking facilities of the country resulted in a develop-
ment of the Federal Reserve System of unequalled rapid-
ity and magnitude. In four years, from 1917 to 1921, 
the development of this system was as great as could 
be expected in twenty years of normal activity. 
I 
I 
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Suoh rapid development has its disadvantages in 
that, under the pressure of war necessity and with the 
"win the war" psychology, policies and expedients were 
adopted that would have been more carefully considered 
or entirely rejected in a period of normal development. 
Thia rapid growth was in some respects beneficial in 
that the inadequacies and limitations of the system 
were accentuated, as were also its potentialities and 
advantages. This accentuation of merits and demerits 
greatly alleviates the task of criticism and consequent-
ly a review and critical examination of the policies and 
functioning of the Federal Reserve System has appeared 
in the scientific journals of this country and England. 
The purpose of this work is to dally for a while with 
a phase of this discussion that has been especially 
spirited; the use of the discount prerogatives of the 
Federal Reserve Board. 
There is, perhaps, no more common error than that 
of supposing, since the Federal Reserve System is 
designed after certain European systems, that the 
individual divisions of the Federal Reserve operation 
should correspond exactly to similar operation in some 
European bank. Perhaps the most persistent of such 
errors, and one that has invaded the highest banking 
and academia circles, is that the discomit rate of the 
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Federal reserve banks is in all respects or even in 
many reepecte comparable to the bank rate of the Bank 
of England. (1) 
A determination of the points of contrast and sim-
ilarity in the banking systems of the United States and 
England presents an admirable point of departure for a 
study of our own banking system. Comparative studies 
are of advantage in that they reveal to us characteristics 
of both phenomena under observation that would have been 
overlooked in a study confined to one phenomenon. This 
method is here applied to one vital function of the 
banking structure and the present work has thus a double 
purpose; a comparative study of discount policies in the 
United States and England and, ultimately, the determin-
ation of important factors and considerations in the 
discount policy of the Federal Reserve Board. 
The Bank of England, in existence over two hundred 
years, could not but have developed a mature and well-
considered discount policy. Discount policies the 
world over are dependent upon certain conditions and, 
on the other hand, various institutions and conditions 
are dependent upon and affected by the discount policies. 
(1) cf. Hepburn, A.B. and Anderson, B.M., The Gold and 
Redisoount Policy of the Federal Reserve Banks. Chase 
National Bank. 
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A somewhat general study of the operations of the Bank 
of England for ten years, 1903 to 1913, reveals the 
important factors to be oonsidered in a discount policy. 
To understand the discount operations of the 
Federal reserve banks as they have developed during and 
since the war it is necessary first to have a general 
conception of the monetary conditions during that period. 
It is hoped that a presentation of effects may result in 
a more satisfactory study of causation. 
Causes may be divided into two classes; general and 
specific. General causes show how certain results are 
possible, specific causes show how they occurred. Since 
the Federal Reserve System in now the chief factor in 
monetary conditions in the United States, a study of 
general and specific causes of the monetary situation 
has been made in the hope that the result w~ll be a 
better understanding of the Federal Reserve System and, 
ultimately, the discount policy of the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
Even the most careful of comparisons attempted on 
the basis outlined above must encounter a very serious 
difficulty. A study of the English system is a study 
of discount policy under normal conditions while the 
study of the American system con1titutes a study of 
discount policy under abnormal conditions. The chief 
purpose, therefore, cannot be a criticism of policies 
of the past but hope may be entertained that a sufficient 
insight into conditions may be secured to make possible 
a somewhat anticipatory criticism of the policy of the 
future. 
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Chapter II. 
The Rate of the Bank of England. 
I. The Bank Rate. 
A glance at one of the periodic reports of 
condition published by the Bank of England will 
reveal one of the most striking characteristics 
of that institution. A complete statement is 
made up under the heading "Issuing Department" 
and another statement is made up under the head-
ing 11 Banking Department". These departments are 
actually separated, not only in accounting but 
in operation. The banking department operates 
independently of the issue department and, on 
the whole, just as it would operate if the issue 
department were a separate institution or con-
nected with another institution. 
The fiduciary note issue of the Bank of 
England is limited to 18 ,450,000 p_ounds. All 
further issues of Bank of England notes may be 
issued only against an equal amount of gold in 
the vaults of the issue department. The elastic 
element, therefore, in the English currency 
system is not in the note issue but in the de-
posit currency, with which the issue department 
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has only a very remote connection but with which 
the banking department has a very real and vital 
connection. The bank rate is one of the most im-
portant factors in this connection. 
The bank rate appreciably affects the amount 
of .deposit currency in England and by many and 
often obscure means. An understanding of the re-
lations between the Bank of England and the other 
English banks is necessary for a successful an-
alysis of the bank rate. 
The Bank of England is a bankers' bank in 
that all of the large London banks, and moat of 
the Scotch banks have accounts with it. Frovin-
cial English banks and branches of London banks 
in towns where the Bank of England has branches 
have local accounts with the bank. (1) These 
accounts are considered by the banks as synono-
mous with cash. In most of their statements 
"cash in hand and at the Bank of Englandn is 
given as a single item and even in cases where 
a distinction is made in the statement the gen-
eral attitude is to consider the account with 
the Bank of England as a part of the cash reserve 
(1) Uational :Monetary Commission. Interviews on 
Banking and Currency Systems. (Senate document 
No. 405, 6lst Congress 2d Session) p. 26. 
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of the depositing bank. 
The bank rate is the official maxiIIIllm rate 
at which the Bank of England is prepared to re-
diecount bills of exchange and is declared every 
Thursday by the directors of the Bank. The rete 
is the same for the entire week, except under 
unusual circumstances when a change may be made 
either by the governor or directors of the Bank. 
It IIIllst be remembered that the bank rate is the 
maximum rate. Under ordinary conditions the 
Bank actually discounts below the bank rate. It 
is necessary to do so to secure business, for 
the Bank of England operates in direct competi-
tion with the other English banks. It receives 
deposits from, makes loans to and discounts bills 
for individuals in the same way as any other 
English bank. In actual practice the working 
discount rate of the Bank of England conforms to 
"the market ra.te 11 and in practice the bank rate 
is often only a fiction. It is the competition 
of the other banks that makes a ficticious bank 
rate necessary. If as was the custom before 
1878, (1) the bank published the actual rate at 
(1) Palgrave, R.H. I., The Bank Rate and the 
Money Market. p. 48. 
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which it was doing business anyone could tell 
whether it would be advantageous for them to dis-
count with their banker at the rate the banker 
quoted or with the Bank of England at the rate 
published. 
The bank rate is the rate at which the Bank 
of England is prepared to discount bills of ex-
change. It does not rediscount loans or advances 
made by the banks to their customers. The rate 
charged by English banks for loans is usually be-
tween one and two percent higher than that at 
whichbills are discounted and the rate the Bank 
of England charges for loans is usually above 
the bank rate. 
Since the bank will buy bills at its pub-
lished rate it is possible for any bank in need 
of cash to sell bills to the bank at or below 
the bank rate and the colonial and foreign ex-
change banks transact a considerable business of 
this nature with the bank. To this extent the 
bank rate is a rediscount rate. The large Lon-
don banks, however, that handle most of the 
English banking do practically no discount bus-
iness at the bank. (1) Many banks maintain with 
(1) Nat. Mon. Com., op. cit. p. 20. 
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pride the record of never having sold any of 
their bills to the Bank. Sir Felix Schuster, 
Governor of the Union and Smith's Bank said, 
"As far as I am aware this bank has never as 
long as it has been in existence had one penny 
from the Bank of England, whether by way of an 
advance or by way of a rediscounted bill". (1) 
This attitude has probably arisen out of the 
faot that the Bank of England and the London Banks 
operate in direct competition. To secure an ad-
vance or to rediscount a bill with the Bank of 
England would be looked upon as seeking aid from 
a competitor and an expedient only to be resorted 
to in an emergency. No London Clearing or West-
end bank could habitually redfscount with the 
Bank of England without arousing suspicion as to 
its condition. 
This does not mean that it is impossible for 
London banks to secure relief from the Bank when 
their reserves are unusually low. The banks under 
such conditions call in their demand loans. These 
loans are usually made to bill brokers and are 
secured by bills of exchange. The brokers are thus 
( 1) Ibid. p. 55. 
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forced to go to the Bank of England for accom-
modation which is secured by the sale of the 
bills formerly used as collateral for demand 
loans. If this is done to a considerable extent 
the Bank of England will be forced to discount 
more nearly at the bank rate and may be obliged 
to raise the rate. 
In times of stringency the burden is shifted 
to the Bank of England, perhaps not as quickly 
but just as definitely as if the banks rediscoun-
ted with the Bank of England. Palgrave susgests 
(1) that this custom has been very important in 
building up the business of the bill broker. Be-
cause of the condition of their reserves and port-
folios, it was necessary at times for the banks 
to tell their customers that they were 11not dis-
counting today11 • This intermittent service oaused 
customers to sell bills to the brokers who gave 
a more continuous service in discounting bills. 
The brokers in turn sold the bills to the banks or 
other investors or used them as collateral for 
loans from the bankers and, if necessary, from 
the Bank of England. 
(1) Palgrave, op. cit. p. 53. 
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II. The Bank Rate and the Market Rate. 
The influence exerted by the rate of the Bank 
of England in the money market is considerable and 
some of the manifestations of this influence are 
readily seen. V1henever the bank rate is changed, 
the London joint-stock bankers meet and decide what 
rate they shall allow on time deposits. Before the 
European War this rate was generally one and a half 
percent below the bank rate. During the war it did 
not always follow the bank rate, being 5% when the 
bank rate was ten per cent. For a considerable 
period, October 10, 1914 to July 21, 1915 the dif-
ference was 3 per cent. Since the latter date the 
spread has shovvn a tendency to be two per cent 
rather than one and a half per cent, but has never 
been greater than two per cent. 
Thru the deposit rate the bank rate exercises 
an influence on the market rate. The deposit rate 
is the a.mount a bank pays for money and the market 
rate is the amount the bank receives by buying 
bills. From the difference between these rates 
the bankers' profit arises and it is perfectly 
natural that an incresee in the bank rate whioh 
causes a rise in the deposit rate should thus 
be a tendency causing an increase in the market 
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rate. ( 1) 
The bank rate also exercises an influence 
that is purely psychological. The Directors of 
the Bank are men of wide experience and their 
judgment is highly respected so. that when they 
' 
raise or lower the bank rate it cannot but have 
an influence on the e.tti tude taken by the bankers 
as a whole toward the extension of credit. 
The bank rate, as has been stated, is the 
official maximum rate at which the Bank of England 
is prepared to buy bi1ls. A large part of the bus-
iness is done in bills having ninety days to run 
and it has become the custom to consider the bank 
rate as the rate at which the Bank of England is 
always prepared to buy prime ninety day bills. A 
prime bill is a bill accepted by a banker or an 
acceptance house apd would be called a banker's 
acceptance in the United States. 
The tendency to use the term "market rate" 
in the singular has often led to the erroneous 
impression that there is only one rate which can 
be termed the market rate. There are many rates 
(1)1 Clare, George., The A. B. c. of the Foreign 
Exchanges. p. 115. 
I 
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that might with justice be termed the market rate 
and when one speaks of the market rate he really 
has in mind the entire group of variable market 
rates rather tha.n any single one of them. But for 
purposes of comparison a single rate is necessary 
and if, as suggested above, the bank rate is con-
sidered as applying to ninety day bills, a true 
comparison can only be made by determining the 
market rate for the same kind of paper. From the 
point of view of volume also this is probably 
advisable since more bills are drawn for ninety 
days than for any other length of time. 
The general opinion seems to be that the 
market rate should be from one half to one per 
cent lower than the bank rate. The market rate is 
determined by the supply of a.nd demand for bills 
and the tendency has been for the Directors of the 
bank to lower the bank rate if any great discrep-
ancy between the rates appeared. As Lord Avebury 
stated "the bank rate is generally a.n expression 
of the market rate 11 • ( l) 
It is evident that as long as the Eank of 
England continues to do business at the market rate 
(1) National ~onetary Commission, op. cit., p. 82. 
-16-
or as long as the bankers can accommodate all 
sellers of bills without the aid of the Bank of 
England the bank rate cannot be used to control 
credit or, es the English say, the bank rate is not 
"effective". 
The bank rate, then is effective when the 
credit conditions are such that the demand for 
credit cannot be supplied without the aid of the 
Bank of England. Formerly this condition was al-
most continuous. As Bagehot said, "At all ordin-
ary moments there is not money enough in Lombard 
street to discount all the bills in Lombard street 
without taking some money from the Bank of England. (1) 
In later days, however, this has not been 
true and the money market has only been forced to 
call upon the bank in times of ususual credit ex-
pansion or at times, such as the dates when the 
income tax is paid, when the joint-stock banks' 
balances are greatly reduced in favor of the Bank 
of England. If neither of these conditions happen 
to be operative and the Bank wishes to exert an 
influence on credit expansion of the money market 
it must take measures to make its rate effective. 
(1) Bagehot, Walter , Lombard Street, p. Bll. 
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This is usually done by borrowing in the open 
market, often thru a broker, and thus forcing up 
the rate of interest. The following is taken from 
the interview of the Governor of the Bank of Eng-
land by the National Monetary Commission: 
Q. Does the bank sometimes borrow money in the 
open market for the purpose of raising the market 
rate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you s ometimes sell consols for the same pur-
pose? 
A. Yes; on rare occasions. (1) 
III. The Bank Rate and Reserves. 
It has almost been accepted as a truism that 
there is a very vital relationship between the 
ratio of reserves to liabilities and the Bank rate. 
When the reserve becomes low the Bank advances its 
rate, in order to decrease loans and encourage de-
posits, in other words rate is raised to protect 
the reserve • .A:n unusually high ratio of reserve 
to liabilities is the cause of a decrease in the 
Bank rate in order to encourage borrowing and to 
decrease the amount of idle funds in the hands of 
the Bank. 
Chart I shows the ratio of reserves to liabil-
( 1) National :Monetary Commission, op. cit., p. 29. 
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ities and the Bank Rate of the Bank of England 
for the ten years from January 1903 to January 
1913. The chart does not seem to bear out the 
statement made in the preceeding paragraph regard-
ing the protection of the reserve by the advance 
of the Bank rate. There are eleven instances in 
the ten years when the reserves fell below 36% and 
in only three cases was this condition accompanied 
or succeeded by an advance in the Bank rate. It 
seems safe to disregard any changes in the Bank 
rate more than two months after these low points 
were reached. On this basis, of the remaining 
eight instances, four were accompanied by a de-
crease in the Bank rate and no change in the bank 
rate took place within two months of the time when 
the remaining four points were reached. Of the 
ten instances when the ratio was between 36% and 
40%; in two cases the rate was advanced, in five 
cases decreased and in three cases no change oc-
curred within two months. Of the thirteen cases 
where the ratio was between 4o% and 45%; in one 
case the rate was advanced, in four cases decreased 
and in seven instances no change occurred within 
two months. 
There seems to be closer relationship between 
a high reserve and a decrease of the Bank rate. Of 
-18-
the thirty-three cases where the ratio was between 
50% and 55%, in fifteen instances the rate was 
decreased, in five advanced and in thirteen no 
change occurred within two months. 
In making a closer examination of those in-
stances where the ratio of reserves to liabilities 
fell to 36% or less it is found th~t nine out of 
the eleven instances occurred near the first of 
January. The demand for funds for the holiday 
season and the fact that the first of the year is 
a great period for settlement in England combine 
to cause a great demand for cash and a correspond-
ing depletion of the cash reserves of the Bank. 
The two instances where the reserves fall to 36% 
which were not at the first of the year were Oct-
ober 13, 1906 and November 9, 1907 and in each 
case the Bank rate was raised; to six per cent in 
the first case and to seven per cent in the second. 
The conclusion that may be drawn is that the bank 
rate does not respond to seasonal fluctuations 
which, as, experience has taught the Directors of 
the Bank, will soon be corrected naturally. It 
cannot be said that the bank rate rises and falls 
as the ratio of reserves to liabilities becomes 
low or high but the bank rate rises and falls as 
the reserve ratio becomes low or high for that 
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particular season. Thus the probabilities are 
very great that a ratio of 40% in September would 
cause an advance in the bank rate while a ratio 
of 35% in the early part of January would ordin-
arily have no effect whatever. 
It must be remembered that so low a reserve 
in September would always be the result of some 
unusual circumstance and it is to this unusual cir-
cumstance that the change in the bank rate may be 
attributed. A very important factor in the relation 
. 
of the reserves ' to the-bank rate is the movement of 
gold, Because of London's position as the money mar-
ket of the world and because of the fact that, before 
the War, it was the only free market for gold in 
bilrope, the importation and exportation of gold was 
always an important factor in connection with the 
bank rate. Chart II shows the imports and exports 
of gold made from the Bank of England for the ten 
years from Jan. 1903 to Jan. 1913. The volume of 
the shipments is indicated by the area of t he rect-
angles. The bases of the rectangles are the bank 
rate. 
By locating on this chart the six instances, 
mentioned above, when the reserves fell below 45% 
and advance in the bank rate occurred we find that 
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in all but one case a concomitant export of gold. 
Since the periodic drains on the reserve do not arise 
from a.n export of gold they have no effect on the 
Bank rate, when a much smaller drain occurs which is 
due to an export of gold its effect is at once not-
icable in an advance of the rate. 
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Chapter III 
Inflation 
I. Introduction 
There are certain problems upon which statistics 
may throw light but which, at the present stage of 
statistical technique, may not be accurately and com-
pletely measured by any statistical method. By the 
statistical process known as sampling tendencies may 
be shown in movements too complex and too comprehensive 
to admit of accurate statistical measurement. It must 
always be borne in mind that sampling does not give a 
complete picture but it does give a representative 
picture. It does not measure movements: it indicates 
trends. 
Irving Fisher's well-known equation of exchange 
presents a problem that is not capable of exact statis-
tical verification. When the physicist says that the 
speed of a falling body is proportional to the square 
of the distance thru which it has fallen he states a 
fact that is more easily proven by demonstration than 
by theoretical reasoning. When Professor Fisher says 
that the level of prices varies directly with the quan. 
tity of circulation medium and its velocity of circu-
lation and inversely with the physical volume of trade, 
he states a fact that is more easily proven by deduction 
than by actual demonstration. Any demonstration of the 
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equation of exchange must be very approximate and 
that given herewith especially so because of the 
limited sources of data, the paucity of samples and 
the lack of statistical refinement. Nevertheless it 
is hoped that some conception of the working of the 
factors of exchange during the period under review may 
be given. 
Stated in its simplest terms Professor Fisher's 
equation of exchange is a statement of the fact that 
the general price is the amount of money used divided 
by the number of things bought. The amount of money 
used is the amount of money in circulation multiplied 
by the number of times it is used. Thus an increase 
in the amount of money or the velocity of circulation 
of money, ceteris paribus, means higher prices and an 
increase in the physical volume of trade, or things 
bought, ceteris paribus, means lower prices. Thus, 
as said above, the level of prices varies directly 
with the quantity of circulation medium and its velocity 
and inversely with the physical volume of trade. 
That Fisher's equation of exchange actually de-
scribes the conditions as they exist during any con-
siderable period is generally conceded though some 
refuse to admit the causal connection that Professor 
Fisher claims to find and others think the explan-
-23-
ation valid but the emphasis misplaced. Some of his op-
ponents have done Professor Fisher's conception the 
doubtful compliment of calling it a truism (perhaps on 
the grounds that truisms cannot hold scientific or ac-
ademic interest) and a similar admission is sufficient 
to allow a basis for the discussion of this chapter. 
In a dynamic society there must be change in the 
physical volume of trade. When an increase in the 
physical volume of trade is accompanied by a proportion-
ate increase in the amount of circulating medium the 
general price level does not change and the phenomenon 
is known as expansion of trade and currency. At times, 
however, the quantity of circulating medium increases 
faster than the physical volume of trade and higher 
prices result. This condition is known as inflation 
and its effect upon the economic structure has been the 
subject of much discussion. The consensus of opinion 
seems to be that inflation on the whole is detrimental 
and should be avoided. In considering the inflation in 
the United States from January 1917 to June 1920 it is 
helpful to remember that inflation progressed not only 
during the war but for a considerable period after the 
war. War finance and the necessities of war may explain 
the inflation during and immediately after the war but 
the continuance of inflation to the middle of 1920 can-
-24-
not be entirely ascribed to these causes. For this 
reason the post bellum inflation is the more interest-
ing and, fortunately, better depicted by accurate data. 
Although the inflation of the currency in the United 
States is here treated as a unit this dual aspect should 
be borne in mind and the greater importance of the post 
war inflation may be considered a recompense for the 
ocoasional failure of the data presented to cover the 
entire movement. 
II. The Price Level 
It is the purpose of this chapter to consider the 
exchange phenomena in the United States from January 
1917 to the summer of 1920. A glance at Chart 3 shows 
a remarkable rise in prices during this period. As 
may be seen from Table 1, Appendix B, the United States 
Bureau of Labor Index of Wholesale Prices rose from 
151.5 in January 1917 to 272 in May 1920. Disregarding 
the quantity of money this phenomenon may be explained 
in either of two ways; by a proportional increase in 
the velocity of circulation of money or by a.n inversely 
proportional movement in the physical volume of trade. 
III. The Velocity of Circulation 
It is a very difficult matter to ascertain the 
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velocity of circulation of the medium of exchange at 
any given place at a given time and the problem of 
obtaining the velocity of circulation for the United 
States for a considerable period of time, even were 
it possible, would be a task the difficulty of which 
would greatly outweigh any advantage that might be 
derived therefrom. The representation given in Chart 
3 is admittedly a very crude attempt to demonstrate 
this phenomenon and should be viewed in the light of 
the following explanation and the ·notation to Table 2 
Appendix B. 
By far the greater amount of the payments made 
in the United States are made by means of bank credit, 
most estimates being well above ninety percent. A 
fairly accurate judgemnt of the relative quantity of 
money changing hands may therefore be secured from 
the debits to individual deposits made in the banks 
of about 150 of the principal cities in the United 
States as reported by the Federal Reserve Bulletin. (1) 
It must be remembered that this is only a relative 
judgment because it includes only the payments made 
in certain centers in the United States and only such 
payments as were made by individuals in those centers 
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1918, P• 820 
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drawing upon their bank accounts. The quality of the 
data is further qualified by the fact that the number 
of reporting centers varies slightly. (2) 
It is unfortunate that it is impossible to ascer-
tain the deposit liabilities for the same period of 
the banks reporting debits to individual accounts. If 
the deposits of these banks could be determined the 
weekly rate of turnover of the velocity of the banks' 
deposits might be determined by dividing the total 
deposits by the debits to individual account for the 
week. Thus if a bank's deposits were $4,000,000 and 
it has Qebits to inQividual account ammounting to 
$2,000,000 in a week, its deposits have a velocity 
of one-half. 
Since it is impossible to determine the deposits 
of the banks reporting debits to individual accounts, 
the deposits of all member banks in the Federal Reserve 
System for the same period have been determined. It 
may be contended that we can secure no accurate measure 
of the velocity of circulation of deposits by dividing 
the amount of deposits in all member banks of the Federal 
Reserve System by the debits to individual accounts in 
(2) See Table 2, Appendix B. 
rr~=--==~==========~~~..-============---. 
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150 of the principal clearing centers in the United 
States. Since the deposits of the member banks of the 
l:!.,e ueral Reserve System do indicate the te:nc} e:ac;,: of 
deposits during this period an.d since the debits to 
I individual accounts in 150 clearing centers do show 
I I the trend of withdrawal of deposits during this period, 
it is po~sible to secure a concertion of the velocity 
of turnover in a general way by plotting these curves 
on a logarithmic scale. 
A curve plotted on a logarithmic scale does not 
give a conception of the actual increase or decrease 
but of the rate of increase or decrease and what is to 
be compared here is not absolute changes but relative 
changes. As far as velocity of circulation is concerned 
a ratio of $8,000,000 deposits to $4,000,000 debits to 
individual accounts is exactly the same as the ratio of 
$4,000,000 deposits to $2,000,000 debits to individual 
accounts. Since the slope of a curve plotted on a log-
arithmic scale shows the rate of increase or decrease 
it follows that two phenomena having the same rate of 
increase or decrease would be represented by two par-
allel lines. 
In viewing curves three and four in Chart 2, 
representing Qebits to indiviuual accounts and uemand 
• 
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deposits of member banks respectively, it may be seen 
that the slopes of these curves are strikingly similar. 
Curve three has been smoothed as shown because of the 
fact that observations are taken for a more variable 
phenomenon and at more frequent intervals. The most 
interesting point in this comparison is that debits to 
individual acoounts tended to decrease faster than de-
posits during the early part of 1920. In other words 
during the peak of high prices the velocity of circu-
lation was less than for preceeding periods. 
IV. The Physical Volume of Trade 
The next factor in the equation of exchange, the 
physical volume of trade, is also not capable of ac-
curate determination. From figures guoteQ by the Fe~-
eral Reserve Bulletin, ten commodities have been chosen 
and an average of their relatives computed as indicated 
in the notation to Table 4, Appendix B. Here again our 
representation is incomplete but effort has been made to 
choose commodities of diversified character so that the 
data may present the general tendency of trade. 
The difficulty of interpreting this curve is great-
ly increased by its irregularity. This is due to the 
fact that the phenomenon is one subject to great varia-
tions especially of a seasonal nature. This is very 
-29-
clearly seen in the periodic diminution of the volume of 
trade during the early months of each year. Viewed in a 
general way the chart indicates that there was no change 
in the volume of trade comparable to the change in the 
price level but that the change recorded was towards an 
increase in the volume of trade. The same tendency is 
shown by Warren M. Persons in hie recent work on The 
Crisis of 1920 in the United States: A Qu.antative Sur-
vey. ( 1) 
An examination of the indications as to the veloc-
ity of circulation of the meQium of exchange and the 
physical volume of trade show movements of these phe-
nomena such as are generally believed to accompany a de-
crease in prices. From reliable sources it is seen, how-
ever, that there was a great increase in prices during 
this period. There remains one factor in the equation 
of exchange to which we may turn for a solution of the 
problem; the quantity of the circulating medium. 
(1) Persons, Warren M., The Crisis of 1920 in the United 
States: A Qu.antative Survey. American Economic Review, 
March 1922 Supplement, pp. 5-19 
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v. The Circulating Medium. 
l. Gold 
From the preceeding discussion the conclusion is 
inevitable that the rise of prices culminating in 1920 
was accompanied by an increase in the medium of exchange. 
It would, perhaps, be more correct to say media of ex-
change for there are many agencies which perform the im-
portant function of intermediary in the exchanging of 
goods for goods. Perhaps the most important element in 
the circulating medium of the present day is gold. 
Chart 4, constructed from the data in Table 1, 
Appendix C, is a graphic illustration of the amount of 
gold in the United States and its distribution. For the 
period January 1917 to July 1919 there is no remarkable 
change in the gold holdings of the United States as a 
whole. The most conspioioua feature of this period is 
the change in ownership of gold. The general stock of 
gold was $3,090 millions on July 1, 1917 and was $3,095 
millions on July 1, 1919, an increase of approximately 
sixteen hundretha of one percent. The gold held outside 
the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks 
decreased from $594 millions on July 1, 1917 to $448 mil· 
lions on July 1,1919 or approximately 25%. Gold in cir-
culation declined from $1,595 millions on July 1,1917 to 
$749 millions on July 1, 1919, a decrease of approximate-
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ly 47%. The gold held in the United States Treasury 
as assets of the Government increased during this 
period from $202 millions to $360 millions or 56% while 
the gold held by the Federal Reserve Banks or Agents 
increased from $700 to $1,539 mi11ions or 45%. 
On June 30, 1919 ~he embargo on gold, originally 
instituted September 7,l9l7, was removed (1) and the 
result was an outward flow of gold continuing until 
May 1920. This movement a.mounted to over $448 millions 
and was accompanied by a constant increase in the price 
level. 
2. Credit. 
When shipment of gold from a country is accompanied 
by rising prices and no decline in the volume of trade 
or increase in the velocity of circulation, the only con-
' 
olusion is that an increase is taking place in the other 
forms of circulating media. That this was true in 1919 
is shown by Chart 5, constructed from the data presented 
in Table 2, Appendix c. The increase in Federal Reserve 
notes and the earning assets of the Federal Reserve Banks 
is most conspicious from the middle of 1917 to January 
1919 but a second period of considerable increase extends 
from July 1919 to December 1920 and much more than coun-
teracts the shipment of gold from the country. The 
(1) Fed. Res. Bul. July 1, 1919, p. 615 
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greatest increase is found in the loans and discounts 
of member banks in the Federal Reserve System, an in-
crease of from $11,805 millions on Dec.31, 1917 to 
$18,076 millions on June 30, 1920. 
The. change in volume of forms of physical money 
other than Federal Reserve notes, such as United states 
Notes, National Bank Notes, Treasury Notes, Silver 
Certificates and subsidiary silver, was practically 
negligible and they have therefore been ignored in this 
I 
chart. It is thus seen that a large measure of the ex-
pansion took place within the Federal heserve System; 
in the form of money thru the Federal Reserve notes and 
in the form of cerdit thru the earning assets of the 
Federal Reserve Banke (1) and the loans and discounts 
of the member banks in the Federal Reserve System. The 
member banks of the Federal Reserve System transact ap-
proximately three-fourths of the nation's banking busi-
ness and have much greater power to expand credit than 
non-member banks. There was undoubtedly some expansion 
of credit by non-member banks but this expansion is not 
determinable. 
It seems that the data presented conforms as well 
as might be expected to Professor Fisher's formula. If 
(1) Earning assets of the Federal Reserve Banks are com-
posed of; bills discounted, bills purchased and govern-
ment securities. 
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the other factors remained stationary, we would expeot 
a change in the volume of circuls.ting medium from 
$16,954, millions on Dec. 31, 1917 to $25,199 millions 
on May 4, 1920 to correspond to the ohange from 183 to 
272 (1) in the general level of prices. As a matter of 
fact our study of a portion of the circulating media 
1· shows a.n increase to $26, 746 millions. There is little 
doubt that the change in the other variables, the vel-
ocity of circulation and the physical volume of trade, 
in large measure accounts for this difference. 
(1) See Table 1, Appendix B. 
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Chapter IV. 
Inflation and the Federal Reserve System. 
r. Introduction. 
The great expansion in currency outlined in the 
preceeding chapter could never have occured in 1913. 
Under the National Banking System such expansion of 
paper money and credit would have been impossible 
without some great and vital change in the system. 
The elasticity of the circulating medium introduced 
by the Federal Reserve system is at once its greatest 
advantage and its greatest danger. This is a result 
of two changes in our banking system; the centraliza-
tion and mobilization of reserves and the creation of 
a discount market. 
II. Reserves. 
The American people have quite generally labored 
under the misapprehension that the proper cash reserve 
for an entire banking system might be determined by 
legal enactment and that the amount of reserve thus 
determined was applicable to all banks within cities 
falling into one category in a classification so broad 
as to divide all the cities in the United States into 
three general classes. The English, with no legal 
reserve requirement, have recognized the fact that 
the amount of reserve necessary may be best determined 
I[ -35-
by each bank upon the basis of its past experience. 
The English banker is generally considered more con-
servative than his American contemporary and the 
concentration of banking power thru the branch bank-
ing system in the hands of a few powerful and long 
established banks has made possible bnaking with a 
minimum of legal regulation. The legal reserve 
ratio is a necessary evil in the United States but 
the fact that the correct ratio is not an arbitrary 
percentage but may fluctuate with changing conditions 
has been recognized in recent .American banking legis-
lation. 
Under the National Banking System the actual 
gold reserve held against deposits was as follows: 
Central Reserve Cities, 25%; Reserve Cities, 15.625%; 
providing they kept one-half of their reserves with 
banks in Central Reserve Cities, as permitted by law; 
Country Banks, 7.4%, providing they kept three-fifths 
of their reserves with banks in Reserve Cities. The 
reserves were widely scattered and in times of stress 
the portion deposited with correspondents was not 
always available. A very apt analogy has been cited 
by Holdsworth who says, "This system of holding bank 
reserves has been compared to a system of fire pro-
-36-
tection in which each of several thousand families 
in a large city keeps its own cistern of water." (1) 
At the outset there are two tendencies percept-
ible in the regulations of the Federal Reserve Act 
in regard to reserves. The first is a tendency 
towards a lessening of the legal reserve requirement 
and the second is a tendency towards centralization 
of the holding of the reserves. According to the or-
iginal act the reserves of member banks were 18%, 
15%, and 12% for Central Reserve City, Reserve City 
and Country Banks respectively, The reserves were 
to be gradually removed from correspondent banks 
during a three year period ending November 1917 and 
held either in the banks own vaults or with the 
Federal Reserve Banks. There was a gradual increase 
in the proportion of the reserve to be deposited 
with the Federal Reserve Banks and on September 7, 
1916 the following Amendment to the Federal Reserve 
Aat was passed: 
Upon affirmative vote of not less than five of its 
members the Federal Reserve Board shall have power, 
from time to time, by general ruling, covering all 
districts alike, to permit member banks to carry in 
the Federal Reserve Banks of their respective districts 
any portion of their reserves now required by section 
(1) Holdsworth, John Thom., Money and Banking p. 348 
r 
I 
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nineteen of this Aot to be held in their own vaults. (1) 
The Board on September 11, 1916 made the following 
ruling: 
In pursuance of the authori ty vested in it by this 
section the Board hereby rules that, effective 
September 18, 1916, and until further notice, any 
member bank so desiring shall be permitted to carry 
in the Federal Reserve Bank of its district any 
portion of its reserves now required by law to be 
held in its own vaults. (2) 
By a further amendment passed June 21, 1917, 
all member banks in the Federal Reserve System 
were required to deposit their entire gold reserve 
with the Federal Reserve Banks and the required 
reserve was reduced to 13% , 10% and 7% for Central 
Reserve City, Reserve City and Country Banke respec-
tively. The Federal Reserve Banks are required to 
hold a reserve of 36% in gold against deposits. It 
is now possible to make a direct comparison of the 
present gold reserve requirements and the gold reserve 
requirements under the National Banking System. 
Aotual Gold Res erve Refui rements. 
l~ationa ll'ederal 
Central Reserve City Banks 
Reserve City Banke 
Country Banks 
Banking Reserve 
Sf stem System 
5% 4.56% 
15.625% 3.50% 
7.4% 2.45% 
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin. September 1916, P• 439 
(2) Federal Reserve Bulletin. October 1916 p. 508 
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A further reduction might be made in the present 
reserve requirements due to the fact that only a 3% 
reserve is required for time deposits, defining time 
deposits as deposits payable after thirty days, whereas 
under the National Banking System the regular reserve 
was required for time deposits. On the other hand 
neither transit items nor the 5% redemption fund held 
at Washington against National Bank notes may now be 
included in reserves as was the custom under the 
National Banking System. The above comparison mu.st 
also be qualified by the fact that member banks in the 
Federal Reserve System must provide for till money 
aside from the required reserve. Allowing 5% for till 
money and supposing it to be composed entirely of 
Federal Reserve Motes, against which the Federal 
Reserve Banks must hold a 4o% gold reserve, it will be 
seen that at least 2% should be added to the reserve 
percentage computee for member banks in the Federal 
Reserve System. 
The above changes in the reserve requirements 
have made the continuance of specie payment by the 
banks much more certain thru centralizing reserves by 
making them more mobile. To complete Mr. Holdsworth's 
analogy the system is now comparable with "having the 
whole city's water supply stored in a connnon reser-
-39-
voir, connected by conduits with every part of the 
city, and so instantly· available in unlimited quan-
tities for the extinguishment of a blaze at any 
point." ( 1) 
It must be remembered that inflation may take 
place without discontinuance of specie payment but 
may even take place when the permanence of specie 
payment is being made more certain. In fact cur-
rency reforms usually lead to inflation because they 
are not usually made in a period of increasing busi-
ness but in a period of depression when the evils of 
the former systems bear most heavily upon the popular 
imagination. 
III. The Discount Market 
Hartley Withers has described the "cash in hand 
and at the Bank of England" or the reserves of the 
English banks as the first line of defense for the 
English Banker end the sums loaned to bill-brokers 
at "call and short notice" as the second line of 
defense. (2) The Federal Reserve Act has not only 
fashioned the first line of defense of the banking 
system of the United States into an almost impreg-
nable fortress but has constructed a second line of 
defense where the merest shadow of entrenchment was 
(1) Holdsworth, John Thom., Op. cit., p. 348 
(2) Withers, Hartley., The Meaning of Money, P• 140 
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formerly visible. 
It will be recalled that the English bank fac-
ing a depletion of its reserves merely gives notice 
to bill-brokers, to whom they have made demand or 
short notice loans. The bill-brokers must then se-
cure assistance from the Bank of England, either by 
selling the bills formerly held by the lending bank 
as collateral for the demand loan, or by presenting 
them to the Bank of England as collateral for a 
similar loan. The second line of defense thus rests 
ultimately on the Bank of England. 
The demand loans held by the American banker 
under the National Banking System formed a method 
of relief not to be compared with that of his 
English contemporary. Note-brokerage is a growing 
institution in the United States and the .American 
note-broker, dealing in promisory notes, is some-
what analogous to the English bill-broker who deals 
in acceptances (to use the .American term). The 
.American note-broker, however, has not been the 
chief source of demand for call loans from the 
American bank . That demand has arisen chiefly from 
the stock-brokers whose business is of a much more 
speculative nature and from whose paper the Federal 
Reserve Banks have rigidly abstained. The individ-
-41-
ual .American bank might increase its reserve by 
calling its demand loans and, as long as other banks 
were willing to accommodate the broker, no evil 
results would ensue. When, however, the movement 
to call demand loans became general and brokers 
were universally denied accommodation the process 
of liquidating such loans became increasingly dif-
ficult and we have the spectacle of oall loan rates 
above 1oo%, a condition peculiar to the New York 
Money Market • 
.As already stated the only hindrance to the 
English joint-stock banks' rediscounting with the 
Bank of England is custom. Thru the intermediary 
of the bill-broker they accomplish the same result. 
In the United States a similar method is impossible 
because of the absence of a demand loan market in 
the form of bill-brokers and beqause the Federal 
Reserve Banks deal with banks and not with individ· 
uals. Consequently there has been established a 
machinery whereby the .American banker discounts dir-
ectly with the Federal Reserve Banks in order to 
build up his reserve. 
The Federal Reserve Act definitely excluded 
from eligibility for discount all paper of a specu-
lative or investment nature with the important ex-
-42-
oeption of 11 bonds and notes of the Government of 
the United States". (1) The Federal Reserve System, 
being composed essentially of commeroial banks, 
should undoubtedly eschew investment paper. Form-
ing the foundation of the oredit structure of the 
United States it is also essential that the assets 
of the Federal Reserve Banks should be non-specula-
tive in oharaoter. It mu.st not be supposed that 
the ineligibility of this type of paper for disoount 
has eliminated it from the portfolios of oommeroial 
banks for the member banks may use the facilities 
of the Federal Reserve Banks by presenting securit-
ies eligible for discount and with the proceeds in-
vest in call loans or any investment that appeals 
to them as profitable and sound. That this practioe 
has been indulged in is shown by the following state-
ment in the Federal Reserve Bulletin: 
Experience has demonstrated that the prohibition of 
direct speculative loans does not of itself aot to 
prevent the indirect use of funds obtained from the 
system for speculation. (2) 
The importance of the rediscount privilege 
should never be lost sight of in considering the 
credit struoture of the country for the proceeds of 
discounting with the Federal Reserve Banks may be 
(1) Federal Reserve Act, Section 13. 
{2) Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1919, p. 1107 
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oonsidered legal reserve by a member bank and 
become the basis of a ten-fold expansion of de-
posits. (1) To restrain an individual bank from 
rediscounting abnormally the Phelan Act of April 13, 
1920 was passed authorizing each Federal Reserve 
Bank to establish a normal discount or credit line 
of each member bank and to impose graduated or pro-
gressive rates on disoounts in excess of this normal 
line. ( 2) 
(1) Note. This does not mean that an individual 
bank may expand deposits by ten times an increase 
in reserves but that the banking system as a 
whole may increase deposits by ten times an increase 
in reserves. Thus if a uniform general expansion 
were taking place the individual bank might increase 
its deposits by many times the increase in its .· es-
erve. See Phillipa, Chester A., Bank Credit, Chap.III 
(2) Ibid., May 1920., P• 448. 
I 
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Chapter v. 
Federal Reserve Polioy and Inflation 
I. The Disoount Rate and Inflation 
A summary of the discount policy of the Federal 
Reserve Board after the entrance of the United States 
into the war may best be given in the words of A. c. 
Miller, one of the members of the Board: 
From that time forth to the beginning of the year 
1920, the discount policy of the federal reserve 
system was shaped not in accordance with money market 
conditions--not with the idea of using reserve bank 
rates as an instrument of effective control of the 
money market--but with the primary purpose of assist-
ing the Treasury in the floatation of its great bond 
issues and its short-term certificate issue. In brieff 
the discount policy of the federal reserve system was 
treated as an element of the Treasury's loan policy, 
the federal reserve system virtually ceasing to ex-
ercise, for the time being, its normal function of 
regulating credit. (1) 
It would have been an extremely difficult if not 
impossible task for the Treasury to float its bonds 
and certificates at the low rate given without the 
assistance of the federal reserve system, not only to 
keep commercial rates low enough so that government 
securities were a profitable investment, but to ex-
tend credit in the form of loans secured by govern-
ment bonds and certificates. Preferential rates on 
bond and certificate secured paper were maintained 
(1) Miller, A. c., Federal Reserve Policy, American 
Economic Review, June 1921,p. 186 
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Table 1. Discount Rates of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. Jan. 1917 - Dec. 1921. 
In Comm- Secured In o.omm- Secured 
effect ercial by Gov't effect ercial by Gov't 
paper obliga- paper obliga-
tions tions 
1917 1919 co ~t. 
Jan. 29 4 .. Aug. 3( 4.75 4.25 
Feb. 28 4 .. 8ept.3C 4.75 4.25 . 
Apr. 1 4 . . Oct • 31 4.75 4.25 
]Jay 31 4 3.5 Uov. 29 4.75 4.25 
June 28 4 3.5 Leo• 31 4.75 4.75 
July 31 4 3 ,5 
Aug. 29 4 3.5 19£0 
Sept.29 4 3.5 ~ 2 6. ' 5.5 
Oct. 29 4 3,5 Feb. 28 6. 5.5 
Dec. 4 4 3.5 Mar. 31 6 5.5 
Dec. 31 4.5 4 May 1 6 5.5 
June 1 7 6 
1918 July 1 7 6 
J~n. 31 4.5 4 July 31 7 6 
E'~b. 28 4.5 4 Aug. 31 7 6 
~.far. 30 4.5 4 Se:pt.30 7 6 
Apr. 30 4.75 4.25 Nov. 1 7 6 
May 31 4. 75 4.25 Dec. 1 7 6 
June 29 4,75 4,25 
July 31 4.~5 4,25 1921 
Aug. 31 4.75 4,26 Jan~ 1 7 6 
Sept.30 4,75 4.25 Feb. 1 7 6 
Oct. 31 4.75 4 .25 .Mar. 1 7 6 
Nov. 30 4. 75 4,25 Apr. 1 7 6 
Dec. 31 4.75 4.25 May l 7 6 
June 1 6.5 6 
1919 July l 6 6 
Jan. 31 4.75 4.25 Aug. 1 5.5 5,5 
Feb. 28 4.75 4,25 Sept.l 5.5 5.5 
Mar. 31 4. 75 4.25 Oct. l 5 6 
Apr. 30 4,75 4 .25 Nov. 1 6 5 
~ay. 31 4.75 4 .25 Dec. 1 4,5 4.5 
June 30 4.75 4 .25 
July 31 4. 75 4.25 
~· The rate is quoted for commercial pape~ of 
61 to 90 days and f or paper secured by Government 
obligations the rate for paper maturing within 90 
days. 
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not only as against commercial paper but also as 
against the rate borne by the bonds and certificates 
themselves. ( 1) 
The effects of this policy in "pegging" the dis-
count rate are seen in Table 1, showing the discount 
rate for ninety day commercial paper and for paper 
secured by Government obligations from December 31, 
1916 to December l, 1921. The rate on paper secured 
by Go vernment obligations up to the point at which 
the policy was abandoned in November 1919 was always 
as low as the rate for the latest issue of Liberty 
bonds and until May 1920 the spread between the rate 
on commercial paper and the rate on paper secured by 
government obligations was never greater than one-
half of one percent. 
A consideration of the above facts presents an 
explanation for the fact that quotas were always 
entirely subscribed by the cities to which they were 
alloted. If, at the eleventh hour, the quota was not 
yet entirely subscribed the banks took up the amount 
unsold and, if in need of money, were able to secure 
a loan for the entire amount at a rate as low as that 
(1) Ibid, P• 186. 
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borne by the bonds themselves. Thus was the patriot-
ism of many a fair city conclusively proven. 
The portfolios of the Federal Reserve Banks were 
affected in two ways by the policy of the Treasury; 
a large amount of short term certificates of indebt-
edness was held by the banks and also a large amount 
of paper seoured by government obligations. The 
amount of liberty bonds actually held by the federal 
reserve banks was proportionately small. These 
facts are graphically illustrated by Chart 6. (com-
puted from Table 1. Appendix E). 
Although the policy of anticipatory borrowing 
by means of Treasury certificates of indebtedness 
and their retention in the banks of the country was 
not the result of the discount policy it evidently 
has a direct bearing upon the question now being 
discussed. Payment for the certificates of indebt-
edness was made by the banks in the form of credit 
which accumulated in the form of Government de-
posits in banks designated as Government depositar-
ies and which numbered in December 1917. 3.818 
banks and trust companies. (l} Perhaps the most 
authoritative statement as to the effect of cer-
tificates of indebtedness on credit expansion is 
( 1) liollander. cJ. H •• wtar horrowing. p. 136 
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that of Jaoob H. Hollander who, after a detailed 
discussion of the use of short-term investments 
during the war, makes the following Etatement: 
A reasonable interpretation of the foregoing 
exhibits, imperfect and inconclusive as they are, 
would seem to be the following; Certifioate bor-
rowing has involved the creation of additional bank 
credits in the form of government deposits rather 
than the transfer to the new government account of 
existing commercial credits. In so far as there 
has been restraint upon the expansion of commercial 
borrowing. it has been due to the reluctance of the 
banks to increase commercial loans and disc ounts 
during a period of heavy government short-term bor-
TOWing culminating in a Liberty Loan, and to the 
pressure put by the banks upon commercial borrowers, 
under like conditions, to apply incoming funds to 
the liquidat· ~~ of existing loans. The primary 
stage in th6 process has thus been an expansion of 
credit in the form of government deposits, unrelieved 
by a corresponding reduction of commercial deposits. 
This expansion has not been self-correcting. 
Pith the cessation of certificate issues and the 
completion of the loan floatation--involving pay-
ment and redemption of outstanding certificates--
the banks have tended to become less urgent credit-
ors and more liberal lenders. The volume of com-
mercial deposits and the amount of money in circul-
ation have tended to increase to a slight extent 
from more active commercial discounting by the banks, 
but to a very marked degree from the accumulation 
of individual deposit accounts of government credits 
liberated in the course of public expenditures. The 
second stage in the process has thus been the disper-
sion among commercial deposit acc ~unts of the volume 
of credit traceable to the certificate issues and a 
withdrawal of s ome part of such deposits for ad-
ditional circulation. 
These movemente--credit expansion in the prim-
ary stage and credit dispersion in the secondary 
stage--have been recurrent in the four succes s i ve 
cycles of our war borrowing, and they have been 
cumulative in result. (1) 
(1) Ibid, p. 191. 
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It will be seen that the lending on government 
securities was large, the high point as indicated by 
Table I Appendix C being November 28, 1919, when the 
Federal reserve banks held $1,736,146,000 of this 
type of paper. vihen it is remembered that a large 
percent of this amount constituted the reserve of 
member banks it will be seen that it formed the found-
ation for a considerable part of the inflation. 
In considering the relationship between the dis-
count policy of the Federal Reserve Board and infla-
tion one must not lose sight of the relation between 
the discount rate of the Federal Reserve banks and 
the general market rate. In the United States we 
have no rate analogous to the market rate in England 
as described in Chapter I. What is generally con-
sidered the market rate in the United States is the 
call loan rate on the New York money market. As has 
been shown the ineligibility of call loans from dis-
count has not deterred banks from doing this type of 
business when it proved profitable. There are two 
results that shJuld be expected in the call loan 
rate as a result of the establishment of the Federal 
reserve system. The rate should not be expected to 
fall so low since the call loan as a liquid asses 
has largely been superceeded by paper eligible for 
discount with the Federal reserve banks. Neither 
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should the rate rule so high because of the power 
of expansibility of a banks loanable funds thru 
rediscount with the federal reserve bnaks. 
It is undoubteQly true, that interest rates 
in general were kept at an artificially low level, 
a proceeding tending to stimulate borrowing and 
thus production, trade and consumption. The pos-
sibility of borrowing at a low rate tended to in-
crease the amount of credit and is thus also seen 
as a tendency towards inflation. To counteract 
this tendency various controls were established 
during the war to divert this stimulation of pro-
duction, trade and consumption to lines directly 
essential to war. These controls; such as the war 
Industries Board, War Trade Board, Food Adminis-
tration, Fuel Administration, Railway Administra-
tion, Shipping Board, Capital Issues Committee, 
New York Money Committee, had very important fin-
ancial consequences. (1) 
Great as were the services performed by these 
agencies they could not adequately control the 
stream of credit and it is undoubtedly true that 
there was inflation due to the borrowing of money 
( l) Miller, A. C. op. p. 186. 
I' 
I 
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for what may be called non-essential industries. 
II. War Finance and Inflation. 
The "trial and error" method of learning has 
been quite prevalent in the effort to learn how to 
finance a war. It is yet to be seen how many er-
rors are necessary to convince a government that 
certain methods are wrong. The persistence of in-
convertible paper and its use in the ~'uropean war 
illustrates the tenacity with which governments 
cling to expedients which have been proved calam-
itous. It almost appears that the issue of incon-
vertible currency is not a premeditated and vol-
untary act but an inevitable consequence of war. 
The experience of the United States in the recent 
war, however, shows that this form of inflation 
may be avoided and it thus appears that our gov-
ernment has at last been convinced of an error 
that, according to some estimates, added $600,000 ,-
000 to the cost of the Civil War. (1) 
It must be remembered that the method used by 
the United jtates in financing the war was made 
possible by the Federal Reserve System. It is hard-
(1) Bogart, E. ~. War Costs and their Financing P• 
324 
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ly conceivable that the expansion which took place in 
our circulating medium could have been possible under 
the National Banking System without suspension of 
specie payments. It is, perhaps, ille to speculate 
whether, had our former banking system remained in 
operation at the time of the war, the Treasury could 
have found a method of war financing that would not 
have resulted in an inconvertible currency. All ex-
perience seems to show that some form of inflation 
would have taken place and it is doubtful whether 
under the National Banking System a ve.ry considerable 
inflation coula. have taken place without suspension 
of specie payment • 
.As has teen shown, inflation did take place in 
the United States. That this inflation was less 
than in practically any other belligerent nation is 
the testimony of the exchange rates. That foreign 
currencies were below par in the United States was 
to a large extent due to the fact that their infla-
tion was greater than ours and as the inflation of 
our currency approached that of foreign countries 
the value of their currency rose in terms of that of 
the United States. Sterling, which rose to $4 in the 
spring of 1920, fell to $3.35 in the fall when our 
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currency was being deflated. (1) 
A discussion as to the possibility of financing 
a war without inflation is obviously beyond the scope 
of this paper. It is indeed certain that war financ-
ing by borrowing from the people must result in in-
flation if the expenditures of the government outrun 
the savings of the people. (2) The question before 
us then is whether the inflation in the United States 
during the last war was any greater than the difference 
between the expenditures of the Government and the 
savings of the people and, if it was, whether this ad-
ditional inflation was necessary. 
That the inflation during and particularly after 
the war in the United States was greater than the 
difference between the expenditures of the government 
and the savings of the people seems evident. The 
Victory loan was floated between April 21 and May 10, 
1919. The last payment for such of these bonds as 
were purchased by instalments was due on November 11, 
1919 while the peak of inflation occurred in the early 
summer of 1920. It thus appears that the inflation 
went beyond that which might be expected from the 
(1) Hawtrey, R. G. The Federal Reserve System of the 
United States., Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. March 1922. p. 238 
(2) Bogart, E. L. War Costs anQ their Financing p. 324 
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floatation of the bonds. 
Inflation appears always to be cumulative in 
effect and it is very doubtful if there is any means 
whereby it may be confined to that amount necessarily 
incident to the floatation of bonds by a government. 
It does appear, however, that the inflation might 
have been somewhat mitigated had the discount rate 
of the Federal Reserve Banks been fixed "with a view 
of accommodating commerce and business" (1) as ex-
pressly provided in the act rather than to enable 
the Treasury to float its bond issues at an artifio-
ially low rate of interest. 
Inflation increases the expense of war to the 
government for the government borrows and makes ex-
penditures in a depreciated currency and, after de-
flation, repays in a currency with a greater pur-
chasing power. If the cost of inflation to the Unit-
ed States in the Civil War was $600 (2) millions 
evidence would go to show that the inflation of the 
Great War cost more than the added interest that 
would have been necessary to float bonds with the 
rates of interest determined by market conditions, 
(1) Federal Reserve Act. Section 14. 
( 2) Bogart, E. L. War Costs and their l!~inancing p. 324 . 
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A£J Carl c. Plehn says, "Inflation is a subtle and 
concealed form of taxation~ but a form of taxation 
that does not add to, but subtracts f~om, the public 
funds • 11 ( l ) 
Entirely aside from disoount policy it is pro-
bable that inflation could be lessened by a method 
of War finance that would substitute a less infla-
tionary expedient for certificates of indebtedness 
purchased by banks and payable in credit. 
Not only does inflation increase the costs of 
the war but it places the burden upon those least 
able to bear it. People with fixed incomes, salar-
ied clerks and laborers feel most keenly the effects 
of rising prices of commodities. Manufacturers, 
merchants and entrepreneurs in general benefit from 
rising prices but in many cases the fall of prices 
during deflation more than eliminates this benefit. 
Viewed as a whole, inflation, with its rising com-
modity prices to be paid from purses whose contents 
do not increase proportionately and deflation with its 
unemployment, business failures, and general derange-
ment of business, if they may not be eliminated should 
be reduced as much ae possible. 
( 1) Plehn, Carl C., Substance and Shadow in War 
Finance. American Economic Review. p. 573 
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Chapter VI. 
The Deflation. 
I. The Discount Rate. 
The Federal Reserve Board resumed its policy of 
fixing discount rates "with a view of accommodating 
commerce and business" in November 1919 by authoriz-
ing a slight increase in discount rates. The average 
for all rediscount transactions in October was 4.19 
percent and for November 4.54 percent. (1) In Deoember 
the differential in favor of discounts secured by 
United States Government obligations was removed and 
a further slight increase in discount rates was made (2 ) 
so that the average of all rediscount transactions 
for December was 4.67 percent. On January 21, 1920 the 
discount rates were again raised this time to 5.5% 
on paper secured by Government obligations and 6 per-
cent on ordinary commercial paper. (3) 
On May 17 the Senate adopted the following res-
olution: 
Resolved, That the Federal Reserve Board be directed 
to advise the Senate what steps it purposes to take 
or to recommend to the member banks of the Federal 
Reserve System to meet the existing inflation of 
(1) Hawtrey, R. G. The Federal Reserve System, Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society, March 1922 
(2) Federal Reserve Bulletin, Jan. 1920, p. 2 
(3) Ibid., Feb. 1920, P• 118 
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currency and credits and consequent high prioes, and 
what further ste~s it purposes to take or recommend 
to mobilize credits in order to move the 1920 orop. (1) 
On May 29 the Federal Reserve Board authorized 
another increase in discount rates which resulted in 
a 7% rate for commercial paper and a 6% rate for 
paper secured by Government obligations. Table I, 
Appendix B, giving the United States Bureau of Labor 
Index Number of Wholesale Prices, shows that this was 
the turning point. The index number of wholesale 
commodities was 272 for May and 267 for June 1920 
and by June 1921 was 148. 
II. Deflation and the Circulating Medium. 
From the movement of prices it might be deduced 
that the largest amount of circulating medium was in 
use in May 1920. This, however, was far from being 
the case. The movement of gold is found to be just 
the opposite of what might be expected. The quantity 
of gold in May was less than in any other mont~ in 
the period from 1917 to 1922 and immediately there-
after there was a continued increase in the amount 
of gold in the country. (2) 
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1920, P• 558 
(2) See Table IV, Appendix B. 
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Even more suprising is that the other forms of 
currency show the same tendency. Federal Reserve 
notes with a circulation of $3,062 millions in May 
1920 reached their high point in January 1921 with 
a circulation of $3,349 millions. The earning assets 
of the Federal Reserve Banks declined in amount slight-
ly in June and July but recovered thereafter and the 
largest monthly total is for October when they amount-
ed to $3,396 millions. Even in December the earning 
assets, totalling $3,263 millions, amounted to more 
than the May total of $3,244 millions. 
The problem of following the loans and discounts 
of member banks in the Federal Reserve System is com-
plicated by the fact that data is available only f or 
those five dates within the year upon which the comp-
troller of the currency calls for reports. It ie 
possible, however, to determine the fact that the 
increase in deposit currency of member banks did not 
cease in May. The report of June 30 shows loans and 
discounts amounting to $282 millions more than the 
report of May 4, 1920. By September, however the 
amount had declined by $54 millions. The index num-
ber of bill holdings of member banks tabulated by 
A. c. Miller seems to indicate that the high point 
for deposit currency in member banks was reached in 
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October. ( 1) 
This seeming anomaly is explained by the fact 
that the type of currency here dealt with is credit, 
One of the gravest faults of the National Banking 
System was that when liquidation commenced the 
amount of credit currency did not expand but even 
contracted. Liquidation started in May but when 
liquidation starts it means that many credits which 
under ordinary circumstances would be self-liquidat-
ing became frozen and more credit is necessary before 
they can be thawed, The continued expansion of credit 
was made even more necessary because of the needs of, 
agriculture for the crop moving season. 
That the circulation of Federal Reserve Notes 
was the last form of currency to show the results of 
liquidation is thus explained by Sprague: 
Increased requirements for currency accompany, but 
with some lag, the increase in credit in the form of 
deposits subject to check. (2) 
(1) Miller, A, c., Curves of Expansion and Contrac-
tion 1919-1921, Annals of the American Academy of 
Folitical and Social Science, Jan, 1922, P• 149. 
(2) Sprague, o. M, w., The Discount Policy of the 
Federal Reserve Banks • .American Economic Review, 
March, 1922 p. 24. 
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III. The Discount Rate and Liquidation. 
The responsibility of the increase in discount 
rates for the liquidation just outlined is a point 
about which there has been considerable dispute. 
There seem to be three schools of thought on the 
matter; The first holds that the absolute effect of 
the increased discount rate on interest rates forces 
liquidation. The second group holds that the discount 
rate forces liquidation thru its psychological effect 
rather than thru its absolute effect on interest rates. 
The third school denies the efficacy of the discount 
rate in forcing liquidation which they nold is due to 
the general curtailment of loans by bankers, for which 
the increased discount rate may be merely the occasion 
and thus more or less coincidental. 
The view that a rise in the discount rate is in 
itself an absolute deterrent to expansion is quite 
generally held in England in regard to the Bank Rate 
of the Bank of England. That this view is held bys 
some English writers in respect to the discount rate 
of the Federal Reserve Banks is shown by the follow-
ing statement by R. G. Hawtrey: 
When Credit expansion with the co~comitant up-
ward tendency of prices has once set in, a rate of 
discount, which under normal conditions would be 
adequate or even high, becomes low relatively to the 
profits to be derived from the use of borrowed money. 
What is needed to secure control is such a rise in 
the rate as will deter traders from borrowing. But 
if prices are rising, the mere holding of commodit-
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ies in stock yields an additional profit over and 
above the usual dealers percentage on the turnover. 
If traders are to be deterred from borrowing money 
to buy commodities, the rate of discount must be 
high enough to offset the additional profit. 
But, it may be asked, how is this possible 
when prices are rising at the rate of 30 peroent 
per annum? No one would contemplate a rate of dis-
count of anything approaching such a figure. Yet 
how can a lower rate be deterrent? 
The explanation is that it is not the past 
rise in prices but the future rise that has to be 
counteraoted. The problem is a psychological one. 
As soon as the rate is high enough to offset the 
traders' hopes of future profits it becomes deter-
rent. And a very relevant factor in the psycho-
logical problem is the traders' expectations as to 
the intentions of the authority which fixes rates. 
If that authority means business, and can be relied 
on to push up rates relentlessly till they become 
deterrent, the mere expectation that this will 
happen may make~te a moderate rate adequate. For 
the prospect of rising prices is dispelled and 
normal standards of profit and interest are re-es~ 
tablished in the traders' minds. (1) 
The second opinion is outlined in the follow-
ing quotation: 
A frequent a.newer to the question as to whether 
reserve bank rates have any control over the market 
is that they have a sentimental effect, even if they 
bear no very definite relation to outside market 
rates: i.e., advances indicate a need for caution, 
while reductions are a signal that restriction of 
credit need not be so rigid. (2} 
(1) Hawtrey, R. G., op. cit. p. 236. 
(2) Youngman, Anna, The Efficacy of Changes in the 
Discount Rates of the Federal Reserve Banks, .Amer-
ican Economic Review, Sept. 1921, p. 477. 
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The third view is thus stated by Anna Youngman: 
There is no intention of denying that the 
announced policy of the Federal Reserve Board as 
advertised by rate advances helped to hasten an 
inevitable credit contraction and served to make 
its consequences less disastrous than they would 
otherwise have been. But it is not believed that 
the changes in discount rates were the directly 
effective weapons of oredit control Downright 
refusal to expand certain classes of loans and 
pressure for repayment of others were the potent 
factors in credit contraction, .and the rate ad-
vances were mere outward signs of the initiation 
of a sterner policy toward member banks. The pres-
sure exerted by the member banks in their turn 
upon their customers no doubt became more severe 
as the result of warnings coming from the redis-
count rates would not have had any material effect 
if they had not been accompanied by vigorous ac-
tion. (1) 
A similar opinion is held by John H. Rich: 
Obviously Federal Reserve rediscount rates can 
control, if at all, only such banks as pay them, 
and such "ban1:s nE:.r net confine t1:.cir bo}-:rov.-ing~ to 
the Federal Reserve--in fact they seldom do. The 
influence of the rediscount rate must be of an 
indirect, and probably of a very tenuous character 
as to all non-borrowing banks, member or non-member 
alike. In most of the Federal Reserve Banks there 
has been some disappointment at the doubtful effect-
iveness of the rediscount rate in periods of rapid 
expansion of credit .•........... 
. ...• From a practical standpoint the control of 
credit is largely a matter of leadership and example 
..... In checking expansion, the promptness and cour. 
age of the Federal Reserve Banks in taking a stiff 
stand against inflation is likely to prove more ef-
ficacious than any decision to advance the rate, 
although both actions must go hand in hand. In 
reality it might be said that an advancing or raced-
(1) Ibid., P• 476. 
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ing discount rate is of material advantage as a 
warning signal but that the practical work of 
the Federal Reserve Bank is in its executive com-
mittee and that the degree of control which it 
exercises, which is necessarily limited by the 
insufficiency of its membership, will be propor-
tionate to the farsighted vision and courage of 
the Federal Reserve Board, whioh supervises, and 
the executive control in each Federal Reserve 
Bank, to which each problem must ultimately come 
for settlement. (1) 
In viewing the liquidation outlined above it 
appears that there is an element of truth in each 
of the above statement. The increased discount 
rates caused a curtailment of loans by heavily 
borrowing banks. This is evident from the fact 
that the earning assets of the Federal Reserve 
Banks first show the signs of liquidation. These 
earning assets in many cases constituted the legal 
reserve of member banks and their reduction neces-
sitated an even greater reduction in the loan ac-
counts of the member banks. It must be remembered 
that deflation like inflation is cumulative and 
it may will be said, 11 Behold. how great a fire a 
little matter kindleth. 11 
If any one faculty may be said to be most im-
portant in business success today, that faculty is 
(1) Rich, John H., Expansion and Contraction from 
the Federal Reserve Standpoint, .Annals of the Amer-
ican Acader'.!Y of Political and Social Science. Jan. 
1922. PP• 179-183. 
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ability to prognosticate the future. Because of 
this fact the business man is especially suscept-
ible to indications of future conditions. Since 
the increased discount rate may be considered a 
weather-sign of liquidation it undoubtedly causes 
contraction by non-borrowing banks and business 
men not directly affected by the rate. 
Some protagonists of the third view seem to 
favor 11 direct actionn (as they call it) to changes 
in the discount rate. Direct action is the abso-
lute refusal to extend loans to speculative bor-
rowers or for purposes of business expansion. It 
is rather difficult to see how this action can be 
effective without a corresponding increase in dis-
count rates. This is shown by the fact that dur-
ing the period of inflation the Federal Reserve 
Board sent out repeated admonitions to restrict 
credit and to favor legitimate and essential in-
dustries. The discount rate, it is true, is inef-
fective unless accompanied by direct action but if 
a condition corresponding to that of "effectiveness" 
of the Bank Rate in England prevails it seems nec-
essary that an increased discount rate must be fol-
lowed by direct action on the part of the banks. 
Some adherents to the view that the discount 
rate is ineffectual as a deterrnet to credit eapan- _. 
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sion seem to hold the view that credit must expand 
until it becomes top-heavy and topples over. In 
this case the chief function of the Federal Reserve 
System would be to ease the fall. As a matter of 
fact the recent experience in the United States as 
a whole serves as a good illustration for this be-
lief. It must not be forgotten, however, that the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank had reached the top-
pling point long before the movement became general. 
The only thing that kept the New York bank from 
going below the legal reserve ratio was rediscount-
ing of paper with other banks. If credit satura-
tion may of itself cause liquidation it must be ex-
plained why liquidation did not occur sooner in 
New York. 
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Chapter VII. 
The Discount Policy. 
I. The Reserve Ratio. 
It has been shown that the Bank of England 
rate is closely connected with the ratio of re-
serves to liabilities, rising as the reserves be-
oome depleted, except when the depletion is season-
al and thus merely temporary, and especially when 
the depletion of reserves is the result of gold 
exports. The ~roper ratio for each season of the 
year has been determined by years of experience. 
This presents the first difficulty attendant upon 
a similar policy in the United States; the correct 
reserve ratio has not been determined. The legal 
minimum has been set at 35% for deposits and 4o% 
for Federal Reserve notes. Proper reserve ratios, 
however may not be determined by law, they must be 
determined by experience. Inasmuch as experience 
was lacking the legal ratio seems to have been con-
sidered proper. Table 2 shows that expansion took 
place until the entire Federal Reserve System was 
expanded almost to the limit. 
The psychology of the American banking public 
seems to be such that the legal limitation of credit 
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Table 2, Ratio of Eeserves to ~iabilities of all 
Federal Reserve Banks, 
Date 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 
January 65 ., 4 53,0 44,5 49 .I} 77.2 
February 66.0 51.3 42.5 50,1 78,1 
:.1:aroh 62.7 51.9 42,7 52,0 77.8 
.April 61.3 52.l 42.4 54.e 78.3 
May 62 .I) 51.8 42,7 58.1 77,5 
June 61.7 52.1 43.6 60.8 
July 58.1 50.2 44,2 63.4 
August 56,4 50 , 7 43 .2 66.8 
September 51,6 51.0 42 .. 5 69,C 
October 49,6 47.9 43.1 70,8 
November 50.0 45.5 44 .4 7-2, 7 
December 50,6 44.8 45.4 71,1 
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expansion is necessary. The original necessity for 
this action was the necessity of curbing "wild-oat" 
banking, one of the oharacteristios of our early 
independent banking system. The legally determin-
ed reserve of the national banking system was in 
some respects no reserve at all for the fear of go-
ing below the legal minimum caused contraction of 
deposits in time of panic when their expansion was 
most necessary. · The legal ratio may have been 
nearly the proper ratio for many of the banks of 
the system at some time of the year but it is hard-
ly possible that for any bank the ratio should be 
the same the year round. The proper reserve ratio 
may best be determined by experience and this holds 
true for Federal Reserve Banks as well as banks 
that deal directly with the public. It appears 
that the correct reserve ratio for the Federal 
Reserve Banks at the present time is considerably 
above the legal minimum and it is very probable 
that to a lesser extent this will be permanently 
true. The Federal Reserve Banks have been so suo-
oeeeful in impounding a large proportion of the 
country's gold that it seems that a safe banking 
policy will require a larger reserve than that 
legally provided for. 
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Even if a fund of experience had been accum-
ulated in regard to the reserve ratio of the Federal 
Reserve Banks it would not form as efficient an in-
dex to credit policy as the reserve ratio of the 
Bank of England since the Bank of England note issue 
is inelastic and any increase in the general deposit 
currency of the country is accompanied by a flow 
from the Bank of England of gold or its equivalent 
in the form of bank notes. A similar increase in 
deposit currency in the United States brings forth, 
not gold or its equivalent, but Federal Reserve 
notes, against which a 40% gold reserve must be kept. 
It is thus seen that the reserve ratio of the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks is not as delicate an indicator 
of the internal credit c onditions as that of the 
Bank of England. 
Because of the relatively greater importance 
of foreign trade as compared with domestic trade 
in England the Bank of England is more susceptible 
to depletion for gold exports than the Federal 
Reserve System. (2) The gold situation has been 
so abnormal thruout the entire period of the ex-
( 2 ) Sprague, o. M. 1 . . ' op. cit., p. 26. 
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istence of the Federal Reserve System that it is 
difficult to s~ate what will be the exact relations 
of the discount rate to gold export and import un-
der normal conditions. It is indeed certain that 
the United states connot continue indefinitely to 
hold the present proportion of the world's gold 
supply. It would be difficult to make an accurate 
judgment as to the probable size of the gold bal-
ance of the United States when a condition of mon-
etary equilibrium is again established between 
nations and it would take a number of years exper-
ience under normal conditions to determine the 
efficacy of the discount rate as a regulator of 
gold movements. 
II. The Market Rate 
"The Federal Advisory Council at its meeting 
on September 20, 1921, expressed its belief that 
rates should bear a direct relation to a Federal 
Reserve Bank's reserve and to the general money 
market and that in addition consideration should 
be given to the items ennumerated in the Council's 
recommendation of May, 17, 1921, as follows: 
l. The reserves of the Federal Reserve System as 
a whole. 
2. The reserve position of the Federal Reserve 
Bank whose rate it is contemplated to change. . 
3. The condition of all the banks of the country 
as a whole, and of the several Federal Reserve 
districts. 
4. The economic and financial condition of this 
country. 
5. world conditions, both economic and political. 
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6. The eventual establishment of a credit rate 
policy for the Federal Reserve Banks by which the 
rediscount rate to mamber banks is higher than 
the prevailing commercial rate, taking due con-
sideration of the prevailing open-market rates 
for various classes of loans both in this country 
and abroad. 
7. Uniformity of rates, while at times practio-
able and desirable, should not be adopted as a 
fixed policy, the System being predicated upon 
the principle that varying conuitions might exist 
in different sections of the country. (1) 
Although this recommendation mentions 11 the 
commercial rate" cognizance is taken of the dif-
ficulty of determining such a rate and the fol-
lowing factors were suggested by the Board as 
those which should be considered in arriving at 
a conclusion as to what is the current rate for 
money: 
1. Rates charged by banks to their regular cus-
tomers. 
2. Rates for one-name paper bought through 
note brokers. 
3. Open market rates on bankers' acceptances. 
4. Rates on Treasury Certificates. (1) 
Line-of-credit loans are the moat common form 
of bank credit in the United States (2) but it is 
rather difficult to say how good an index of mar-
ket tendencies line-of-credit rates are. There 
( 1) Harding, \,. P. G. , :Principles Governing the 
Discount Rate. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. Jan. 1922, p. 188. 
(2) Idem., p. 185. 
-73-
is no open market for line-of-credit loans and 
I 
there are no published rates . The rates themsel-
ves are not as competitive as other forms of 
credit because the competition extends to service 
and personal relations while with the aooeptance, 
for instance, the c ompetition is confined more 
exclusively to the rate. 
Anna Youngman says in regard to acoeptances: 
Even with the preferential buying rate which 
acts more or less as a subsidy to dealers in ac-
ceptances, the market has not developed according 
to expectations. The Acceptance Bulletin of May 
1921 gives the result of a nation-wide inquiry 
into acceptance conditions. The results of a 
quite comprehensive survey showed that on April 
1, $664,092,000 of bankers acceptances were out-
standing, a decline of 18 percent from the pre-
ceding year. (1) 
This decline in acceptances should be viewed 
in the light of the general decline in credit and 
also in our foreign trade. It is also interest-
ing to note that there was a relatively greater 
decline in trade acceptances than in bankers' ao-
ceptanoes. E. E. Agger says on this point: 
.Another notable circumstance is the specially 
large drop in trade acceptances as contrasted with 
bankers' accepts.noes. The experience with trade 
acceptances has not been particularly encouraging. 
(1) Youngman, Anna, op. cit., p. 479. 
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In nature, the trade acceptance differd diamet-
rically from the banlrnrs' acceptance and exper-
ience seems to rrove that it lends itself to 
serious abuse. i l } 
It appears that the realm of the acceptance 
in the United States for some time at least is 
to be chiefly that of foreign trade. As long as 
the domestic trade of the United States is so 
much greater than her foreign trade the accept-
ance, dealing chiefly in foreign transactions, 
will be an imperfect credit index. 
The rates for one-name paper bought through 
note brokers represents the rate for an increas-
ing amount of credit transactions. It is a high-
ly competitive rate but because of its excellent 
character and the wide field of competition usual-
ly somewhat below the local line-of-credit rates. 
The necessity for considering the rates on 
Treasury certificates as one of the four most 
important elements in a discount rate is not clear. 
If the discount perrogati ve is to be used 11wi th 
a view of accommodating commerce and business 11 (2) 
little attention can be paid to the rates on 
(1) Agger, E. E., An Open Market for Commercial 
Paper • .Annals of the .American Academy of Political 
and Social Science. Jan. 192G, p. 217. 
(2) Federal Reserve Act, Section 14. 
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Treasury certificates. The rates on Treasury 
certificates should be fixed in view of the pre-
vailing interest rates and should not be 11 bot-
tle-fedli by means of preferential rates. 
III, The English and American Rates. 
It is now possible to briefly outline some 
of the contrasts between the English and .American 
discount rates. 
The English rate is a rate to individuals 
while the American rate is a rate to bankers. Since 
the Bank of England is in competition with the 
joint-stock banks the published rate at which it 
is prepared to discount is always as high as the 
market rate and, lest the competition be too ob-
vious, is usually above the market rate. The 
joint-stock bankers do not rediscount at the Bank 
rate; they call their demand loans (which may be 
compared to rediscounting them at the market rate} 
and the Bank rate is the maximum rate at which the 
brokers may secure accommodation. The English 
banker is not penalized in liquidating his loans 
when the Bank rate is above the market rate. The 
American banker is penalized in rediscounting if 
the rediscount rate is higher than the original 
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discount rate. 
The English rate is usually a fiction, The 
American rate is the rate at which business is 
actually carried on. The fact tha~ the Bank rate 
is above the Market rate in England then usually 
has no significance. It is so much ink on a 
sheet of paper. :Business is done at the market 
rate. The .American rate is the rate at 'wYhich 
business is actually carried on and therefore, if 
it should correspond with the English rate at all, 
should correspond with the rate at which the Bank 
of England actually does business and not the rate 
it publishes. 
The Bank of England rate is quite commonly 
ineffective, i.e., an increase in the rate would 
have no effect on credit conditions. This, of 
course, would be true if, as shown in the preced-
ing paragraph, the Bank continued to do business 
at the market rate. When the rate is raised, how-
ever, the Bank of England is usually desirous of 
controlling credit and therefore the rate it ac-
tually demands will approach the published rate. 
Quite often it arrises that an increase in the 
Bank rate and a corresponding or greater increase 
in the rate actually demanded by the Bank will 
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have no effect on oredit because borrowers can 
secure accommodation at joint-stock banks at the 
market rate. For a number of years the Federal 
Reserve Bank rate has been continuously effective 
and will remain effective as long as there is dis-
counting with the Federal Reserve Banks. As long 
member banks are discounting with the Federal 
Reserve banks an increase in the 6..iscount rate 
will cause curtailment of credit. If the Federal 
Reserve Bank rate is to become effective in the 
same way as the English rate credit must be con-
tracted until the credit needs of the country can 
be entirely supplied without the aid of the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks. 
It is perfectly logical that the Bank of Eng-
land rate should be above the market rate but 
none of the reasons for this superiority applies 
to the Federal Reserve Bank rate. 
IV. Should the Discount Rate be Above 
the Market Rate? 
The general opinion in the United States 
seems to be that eventually the Federal Reserve 
Discount rate should be higher than the market 
rate. The difficulty of so estaolishin8 it has 
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always been recognized but there has been a rather 
sanguine expectation that circumstances would 
ultimately arise which would make such a change 
possible. The opinion that the discount rate 
should be above the market rate has generally been 
based on two arguments; first, the English Bank 
rate is generally above the market rate, there-
fore the American rate should be above the market 
rate; second, that discount privilege is an emer-
gency privilege and should only be used in times 
of extreme necessity and banks resorting to it 
should be penalized therefore. 
The following selections from an article by 
A. B. Hepburn and L. ~ • .Allderson Jr. illustrates 
the first point of view. 
Five main factors have been considered by 
the Bank of ~'ngland in fixing its rediscount rate: 
1. Is the reserve ratio high or low? 
2. Are trade and speculation expanding or are 
trade and speculation depressed? 
3. Is gold coming into or going out of the coun-
try? 
4. Are the exchanges favorable or adverse to 
England? 
5 . What is the market rate? Bank Rate must not 
fall below it, and is almost always above it. 
Of these five consider ations the dominant one 
hai;;i c.t.lV,&ys 1.,Cen ,:;};.,,.:t oi :.:e1.,-""i:;.16 &--:.,v, 0 ·t,~···"" ir.c.:.c:rn1, . 
When necessary to conform with this principle, 
rediscount rates have been raised in the face of 
high reserve ratios and, in harmony with this 
principle, have been lowered in the fact of low 
reserve ratios, ... , .... 
There are really several rediscount rates at 
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the Federal Reserve Banks; a rate on loans on 
Government war paper; another rate, which may be 
different on commercial paper; a third rate, 
which may be still different, on acc~ptances. The 
important thing is that each of these rates should 
be above the market rates for each type of loan. (1) 
It is hoped that the preceding section has 
made clear the falacy of such analogous reasoning. 
Such discussion merely clouds the issue. The 
English Bank rate is usually above the market rate 
but it no more follows that the same practice 
should be followed in America than it follows that 
steam heat should be introduced in the Sahara be-
cause of its successful operation in New York City. 
The discount operations of the Federal Reserve 
Banks are so unlike the corresponding operations 
of the Bank of England that such a question as the 
one under discussion may not be decided with refer-
ence to English customs but soley with reference to 
conditions in the United States. 
The point that the discount privilege is not 
a normal and customary operation of the Federal 
Reserve Banks is a much more logical foundation 
for the conclusion that the Federal Reserve Dis-
(1) Hepburn, A. B. And Anderson, B. M, The Gold 
and Rediscount Policy of the Federal Reserve Banke. 
Chase National Bank. 
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count rate should be above the market rate. If 
the premise may be granted the conclusion is sound. 
The following quotation from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin shows that the Board has been in-
clined to consider the discount privilege as an 
emergency measure; 
Already some well-managed member banks are 
showing in their statements the extent to which 
they are in debt to Federal Reserve Banks. It 
has been the opinion of the Board that the borrowing 
of member banks at Federal Reserve Banks might very 
easily be carried to excess, the loans being placed 
there primarily for the purpose of profit and not 
for any more general public or fundamental object. 
In a general letter to banks issued in November 
(1918) and referred to in the Federal Reserve Bul-
letin for December the Board took occasion to cau-
tion member banks which it thought were in some 
danger of overdoing their rediscounting that the 
purpose of such rediscount operations was not pri-
marily that of assisting the member institutions 
which placed the rediscount to obtain the funds 
for further profitable operations but was rather 
to be determined upon the basis of general banking 
advantage or upon that of relief for banks which 
found themselves hard pressed or were suffering 
from reductions in reserve account. (1) 
That banks have discounted for profit is un-
deniable and the only feasible way to stop such 
practice is the establishment of the discount 
rate above the market rate. The point to be decid• 
ed is whether the advantage to be derived from 
eliminating such a nefarious practice, if such it 
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin. April 1919, p. 311. 
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be, is greater than the disadvantages which would 
necessarily accompany a discount rate above the 
market rate in the United States. 
Another practice that might be eliminated by 
a ~iscount rate above the market rate is that of 
keeping the reserve ratio always very near the legal 
minimum. Anna Youngman's study of eleven New York 
banks led to the following conclusion: 
Since member banks have to maintain required 
reserve with the federal reserve banks, they are 
disposed to reduce the expense thereby entailed 
to a minimum. That often means that they will 
keep their reserves at such a low point that any 
unexpected or unusually heavy withdrawals will 
necessitate an application for rediscounts. Thie 
disposition was particularly noticable in follow-
ing the daily reserve statements of certain of 
the eleven banks to which reference has been made. 
If rediscount rates were above outside lending 
rates, this attitude toward the reserve require• 
ment would be altered beoause penalties would 
attach to the failure to make adequate provision.(1) 
If the discount privilege is to become an 
emergency expedient a much greater contraction 
of credit than has yet taken place must occur. 
The earning assets of the Federal Reserve Banks 
reached their lowest point reported by the 
Federal Eeserve Bulletin since April 1917 on 
June 21, 1922. Even so the average daily 
(1) Youngman, Anna., op . cit. pp. 478-479. 
I 
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holdings of discounted bills as reported by the 
Federal Reserve Banks for June 1922 was $438 
millions and it is probable that credit running 
up to a billion was based upon this amount. If 
a billion of credit is based upon the discount 
privilege in the trough of depression may it be 
called an emergency measure? If discount is not 
to be a normal and customary operation it must 
follow that the discounts at times of contracted 
credit must be practically negligible. If 
depression went beyong this point (and in a 
dynamic society under present monetary conditions 
it seems that currency must always be either 
contracting or expanding ) the credit situation 
would be out of the control of the Federal 
Reserve Banks. It is not conceivable that the 
expansion of discounts of the Federal Reserve 
Danks coulQ attain a volume an~thing to compare 
even with their present volume since member 
banks rediscounting would do so at a disadvantage. 
The business cycle, it appears, would then revolve, 
for the most part independently of the Federal 
Reserve Banks; control reverting to the Federal 
Reserve Banks only at the points where crises 
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develop and member banks would be willing to 
rediscount at a loss. The Federal Reserve 
Banks would thus be shorn of a large part of 
their power to control credit conditions. 
It is certain that a contraction to where such 
a condition could exist is impossible at the 
present time and it is doubtful whether it will be 
possible as long as the Federal Reserve System 
exists in its present form. The concentration of 
gold in the Federal Reserve Banks has removed part 
of the normal circulating medium of the country and 
has replaced it by eredit. The elimination of the 
greater part of this cre~it would involve a very 
serious contraction. It is the condition of trade 
in a country rather than the quantity of circulating 
medium that determines the point where deflation 
shall cease. Evidence seems to show that such a 
point has been reached in the United States. It is 
doubtful whether further contraction could be 
forced without most unusual measures by the Federal. 
Reserve Banks and it seems evident that the harm-
fullness of such action would greatly outweigh the 
advantage of establishing a discount rate above 
\: 
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advantage of establishing a discount rate above 
the market rate, if there be such advantage. 
The conclusion is; not that the discount 
rate should always be above the market rate, nor 
even always below; but that it may be either above 
or below the market rate as dictated by circumstan-
ces. It seems that as long as the present position 
of the Feueral Reserve Banks continues that the 
discount rate should be below the market rate in 
the trough of depression and, as a matter of fact, 
most of the time. There may be conditions of 
inflation where the necessary contraction may be 
secured only be a rate above the market rate and 
under such circums.tances such a rate is not only 
justifiable but advisable. 
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TABLE I, UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR INDEX 
NUlilliER OF· WHOLESALE l?RICES. 1917-1922. 
(Average price for 1913 = 100) 
onth 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 
January 152 185 203 248 178 
February 157 187 197 249 167 
March 162 187 201 253 162 
April 173 190 203 265 154 
May 183 191 207 272 151 
June 106 193 207 269 148 
July 187 198 21 262 152 
August 186 203 2~6 250 152 
September 184 207 221 242 150 
October 182 205 223 225 ... 
November 184 206 230 207 ... 
December 183 207 238 189 ... 
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TAELE II, gfili~n~0cR~i!~D&-Al.T~cgg~ih1~Tf~~~~ 1!:. 1918-
Nov . 1921 inc. 
( In millions of dollars; i.e,, 000 ,000 om1 tted) 
For weeks Debiti to To al :ror Wee.1tly average Number ~ ending individual nfontb 
account for month, centers 
reTiorting 
1918 
lug." 16 6, 736 
106 22 5,347 
29 5,520 16 ,601 5,534 106 
sept. 4 5,483 106 
11 f,t60 126 
18 6,133 125 
26 6,106 23, 981 5,996 126 Oct, 2 7 ,221 126 
9 6,628 140 
16 6, 738 140 
23 7 ,817 140 
30 8,430 36 ,833 7 ,367 140 140 Nov, 6 6,864 146 13 'l ,417 
146 20 8 ,066 146 27 8,168 30,492 7 ,623 146 nee. 4 7 ,109 148 11 7 ,399 148 18 7 ,648 148 26 6,944 148 31, 6,894 36, 994 7 ,199 148 
1919 
ran. 8 9 ,062 148 16 7 ,667 148 22 8 ,294 148 29 7 ,169 32 ,082 8 ,021 148 Feb, 6 8,103 148 12 · 6,891 148 19 7 ,526 148 26 6,630 28 ,149 7 ,037 148 liar, 5 7 ,683 us 12 6,833 148 19 8,102 148 26 6,804 29 ,422 7 ,366 148 Apr, 2 7 ,719 1'8 9 7 ,256 148 
16 7 ,992 148 
23 7 ,132 148 
30 7 ,612 37, 712 7 ,542 148 
lls.y, 7 7 ,838 148 
14 8,323 148 , 
21 9 ,036 148 
28 8,172 33, 369 8 ,342 148 
June 4 8, 746 148 
ll 8,964 
. 118 
18 9,892 148 
I 
26 8,618 26 ,120 9 ,030 148 
July 2 9,f.56 148 
9 7 ,669 148 
16 10,217 148 
23 9 ,674 148 
30 8 ,507 45,622 9 ,124 148 
Aug. 6 9 ,483 148 
13 9 ,208 148 
20 8,619 148 
I 27 7 ,951 35 ,261 8,816 148 Sept. 3 6,887 148 10 8 ,3Zl 148 
17 10,213 148 
24 9 ,164 34, 596 8,649 . 14,8 
Oct. 1 9 ,699 148 
8 9 ,801 148 
16 8 ,970 1480 
<2 10 ,506 148 
I 29 10,107 48, 982 9, 796 148 Nov . 6 9 ,978 148 12 10,777 148 
19 11,082 148 
26 10 ,048 41,886 10,471 148 
Dec. 3 9 ,!:il7 146 
10 9 ,467 148 
17 10, 976 148 
24 10,43G 148 
31 9 , '781 60, 172 10,034 148 
1920 
J'in.' 7 10,613 148 
14 10, 188 148 
21 10,399 148 
28 8,979 40 ,079 10 ,020 148 
Feb. 4 10 ,169 148 
ll 9 ,163 148 
18 8,636 148 
26 7 ,721 35,568 8,892 148 
Mar, 3 10,291 148 
10 8,816 148 
17 10.276 148 
24 9 ,463 148 
31 9 ,661 46,397 9 ,679 148 
Apr. 7 6,966 148 
14 ~.628 148 
21 10,306 148 
28 9,394 38 ,284 9 ,671 148 I May. 5 9 ,664 148 12 9 ,230 148 
19 9 ,273 148 
26 9 ,159 37 ,217 9,304 148 June 2 8.421 153 9 8,948 153 
16 9 ,727 153 23 9 ,247 163 l . ~ _9 ,060 46 ,394 9,079 153 July 7 8,589 154 14 9,377 164 21 9 ,273 164 28 8,252 35 ,492 8,873 164 Aug. 4 8,839 154 
.~ 
8,343 154 
·~-- -
U4 I 26 7 ,986 33 , 716 8 , 429 154 Sept. 1 8 ,443 164 8 7 ,161 164 
16 8,979 154 
22 9 ,373 154 29 8,639 42, 595 8 ,619 154 Oat. 6 9 ,837 155 
13 8,069 155 
26 10 ,536 156 
I 27 9 ,343 37, 784 9 ,446 156 Nov. 3 8, 719 156 10 9,616 166 
17 <J ,983 166 
24 9,160 37 ,477 9 ,369 166 
Dec. l 8,112 157 
8 8,477 157 
16 9 ,360 167 
22 9 ,821 167 
29 8 ,499 44 ,270 8 ,864 167 
1921 
= 6 10 ,810 167 12 8 ,694 157 
19 9 ,178 167 
I 26 8,163 36 ,846 9,212 167 Feb, 2 8 ,663 167 9 7 ,49C 157 
16 7 ,346 167 
23 6,481 29 ,979 7 ,496 167 llar, 2 8 ,566 167 
9 7 ,460 167 
16 8,562 160 
23 7 ,668 167 
30 6 ,393 38 ,600 7, 700 167 Apl°. 6 7 ,696 163 
13 7 ,106 153 
20 7 ,648 153 
27 6,910 f:9 ,360 7 ,340 153 
llay 4 8,076 163 
ll 7 ,287 163 
18 8,497 163 
26 6,992 30,863 7 ,713 163 JUne l 6,997 163 
8 7 ,836 163 
16 7 ,961 163 
22 7 ,886 163 
29 6,891 37 ,561 7 ,512 153 July 6 7 ,579 152 
13 7 ,312 152 
20 7 ,392 l52 
27 6, 717 l::9,001 7 ,260 152 
Aug. 3 7 ,681 154 
10 6,719 164 
17 6 ,961 164 
24 6 ,184 164 
31 6 ,286 33,832 7 ,666 164 
Sept. 7 6,097 166 
14 7 ,136 166 
21 8 ,306 166 
28 7 ,f.8f 26 ,623 7 ,2C6 156 
oat. 6 8,391 166 
12 6,648 166 
19 8 ,914 166 
06 7 ,4,2 31,395 "'"""""' 7 ,84-9 = 156 Nov. 2 8,561 164 
9 7 ,314 154 
16 7 ,499 164 
23 8 ,288 31, 663 7 ,916 164 
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Note on T.Ab1E II. 
This table shows debits to individual accounts for 
banks in important clearing centers of the United states 
as reported by clearing house managers thru the Feoeral 
Reserve Banks. (1) It shows the total of checks drawn 
on and paid by each reporting bank and includes checks 
drawn by individuals, firms, corporations and the 
United States Government. Ordinary clearing-house 
returns show only the total of checks which actually 
pass thru the clearing house and thus fail to account 
for the large volume of checks which are settled thru 
the individual banks. rn order- t o eliminate fluctuations 
due to fortnightly and monthly payments the weekly 
average for each month has been determined. 
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1918, p. 820 
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TABLE III, DEMAND DEPOSITS OF MEMBER BANKS IN 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM. 
( In thousands of dollars, 1. e. , 000 omitted) 
Date. Number of banks Demand 
reporting Deposits 
Dec. 31, 1917 7,907 11,175,676 
May 10, 1918 8,132 11,050,610 
June 29, 1918 8,213 10,753,727 
Nov. 1, 1918 8,596 12,016,310 
Dec. 31, 1918 8,692 13,307,303 
:t1ar. 4, 1919 8,725 12,273,002 
June 30, 1919 8,822 13,195,072 
Nov. 17, 1919 8,995 14,849,003 
Dec. 31, 1919 9,066 15,156,169 
May 4, 1920 9,291 14,833,215 
Jun .• 30, 1920 9,399 15,06'1,172 
Nov. 15, 1920 9,567 14,779,480 
Dec. 29, 1920 9,606 14,019,901 
Apr. 28, 1921 9,698 13,074,225 
June 3C, 1921 9,745 13,292,177 
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TABLE J;V, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN RELATIVES OF TEE El!YSICAL VOLUJ.IE OF TRADE, 
1918 - 1921 . 
( Monthly average 1911 - 1913 = 100 l 
rear Live- Live- Sugar Bit. Anth Crude Pig Cotton! Rew Ton- Total Av-
a.nd stock stock re- Coal Coal Oil Iron oon- silk nage of erage 
Month re- Bhi:p- ceipte Mar- Prod. eumed im- clee.r Rel- of rel 
oeipts mente keted _l ports ed. ati vee ati vee 
i:: ..i OJ, 0 ,.. v ':I 1-U J..:; 
PW I 
TaE7 H3 109 67 116 94 160 104 117 121 68 1078 107 .8 
Feb. 125 116 106 128 106 164 107 122 84 63 1119 11119 
J.!ar. 124 150 114 131 126 180 139 127 
1 
107 78 I 1275 127 .5 
4Pr. lJ..3 121 13C. 126 159 174 142 121 144 77 1309 130.9 
llay 102 104 172 137 160 180 1149 128 134 112 1368 136.B 
June 99 110 139 140 112 179 143 117 1 144 113 1296 129,6 
July 117 116 101 150 128 184 148 120 98 129 1291 129 ,1 
Aug. 109 143 89 150 123 174 146 119 186 132 1371 137 .1 
Sept. 141 197 79 140 109 173 148 109 194 111 1401 140,l 
Oct• lUI 212 82 143 19& 183 151 98 138 104 1367 136, 7 
Nov. 157 177 76 1.ao 87 i77 145 102 114 97 1352 136.2 
Dec, . . . . • . . • • . . • • • . . . . 148 . , . . ·, , . . . . . . . .... 
1919 
JaE7 160 139 93 112 105 158 143 124 71 78 1183 118, 3 
Feb. 125 118 165 91 74 160 I P6 103 91 76 1053 106,3 
"'4r, 106 117 126 91 70 168 133 96 87 76 1068 106,B 
Apr• 110 112 17 3 87 93 153 107 106 146 , 98 1186 118. 6 
May 114 113 177 101 1101 156. 91 109 230 lo6 1200 120.0 
June 116 139 148 100 100 166 91 106 168 126 1276 127, 6 
July 120 135 144 115 10s 17 7 I 106 I 113 254 136 1407 140. 7 
Aug. 117 175 134 116 109 177 118 112 186 148 1392 139.2 
Sept. 142 2:30 142 128 101 176 107 109 330 131 1596 159.6 
oat. 151 22s 127 l47 111 174 so 123 193 121 1551 155.1 
~~;: :~~ ::~ . ~~ . ~~ ~:~ ~~~ I i~: :~: ~~~ :~~ :~~~ :~~:: 
= ~ I TaE7 139 144 113 131 lCl 177 130 132 U7 00 l-4C• 140.4 Feb. 102 119 178 112 90 179 133 119 1187 89 1308 130,B 
J!ar. 110 119 182 126 108 190 146 128 122 106 1336 133,6 
.a.,r. 90 107 169 102 85 189 118 126 109 115 1210 121.0 
trey 112 117 138 107 109 193 129 u .o 122 133 1280 128,0 
June 110 122 161 118 112 196 131 124 167 1163 1396 139 • 6 
July 100 134 210 123 113 201 132 117 1 26 178 1434 143.4 
Aug. 109 156 168 131 110 206 136 107 132 194 1448 144.B 
Sept. 114 159 59 138 64 198 136 102 96 178 1263 125 .. 3 
Oct. 116 186 59 127 111 208 142 I 89 ' 76 187 1310. 131.0 
Bov,. 129 178 101 138 102 204 1127 \ 74 66 159 1277 12V • ! 
Dec. 106 126 81 141 114 20;j 117 66 48 140 1141 114,1 
1921 4 
JaE7 · 4 Bl 36 114 1042 104, 2 Feb. li..3 H,9 6C, 109 l uO 19-7 . -· · 1:.~ - '" 94 J 122 I 109 1167 116,7 
IIBr. 110 115 133 89 106 l~& I B • S7 10" 110 1168 116,B 
A r • 102 119 167 82 100 214 i~ 91 237 122 1277 127 .7 
p • 95 106 188 74 104 209 I 98 217 123 1041 104.l 
May 99 104 137 90 101 218 63 189 1210 121 O 
JJu~e 107 107 101 91 106 211 46 l~f 238 i!~ 1080 lto:o 
u Y 87 96 .. , 82 95 210 37 
Aug. 106 131 . . . 93 . 97 ~14 141 104- 260 142 1178 130.9 
s,pt · 106 160 . • . 95 96 J 191 43 10s i~s \ 147 11so 12s .. 9 
Oct. 122 J.77 . . . 118 lC2 186 53 I 110 154 134 1156 128,6 
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Note on TAI,LE IV. 
All quotations in this table are of relatives as 
determined and published in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. "It has been found necessary to employ a 
statistical refinement in the calculation of relative 
figures for the month of February. As such figures 
would manifestly be too low were t~ey calculated from 
the actual figures for the month in the calculetions 
the latter have been increased by one-fourteenth in 
order to obtain figures which represent approximately 
production, movements, etc., during a month of 30 
days." ( 1) 
Columns 1 and 2. Livestock receipts anQ shipments are 
reported for: cattle and calves, hogs, sheep and horses 
and mules by 15 western markets; Chicago, Kansas City, 
Oklahoma City, Omaha, St. Louis, st. Joseph, St. Paul, 
Souix City, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Denver, Fort Worth, 
Indianapolis, Louisville and Wli.chita. 
Column 3. Sugar receipts are compiled from data of 
the International Sugar Committee for ports of Boston, 
New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, New Orleans, Galveston, 
San Francisco. 
Column 4. Bituminous coal producti0n fro~ data compiled 
by the United States Geological Survey. 
Column 6 • .Anthracite coal production data secured from 
Anthracite Eure~u of Infcrmation. 
Column 6. Crude oil marketed determined from data of 
the United States Geological Survey. 
Coluon 7. Pig iron production from data computed by 
Iron Age. 
Column 8. Cotton consumed determined from data of 
Bureau of Census. Current figures for cotton consump-
tion are expressed as percentages of averages of 
figures for the crop years ending Aug. 31, 1912, 1913 
& 1914. 
Column 9. Raw Silk imports reported b~ the Department 
of Commerce. 
Column 10. Tonnage of vessels cleared in the foreign 
trade as reported bJ the Department of Commerce. 
TABLE V. 
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ROI.DING 0>' GOLL IN THE UN ITEL STATES. 1917-1921. 
(In millions of dollars; i.e., 000,000 omitted) 
Year Held 
lield by f I Helo. in General end OU hide 
Month of the or for T:reeeury Stock Fed. Rea. ae of 
.u.s. Banke or Aeeete Gold Tree.a. Agents( l) of Gov• t. 
and the 12 I 
Fed.Ree. 
Banke I 
1917 jiuy 693 7CO 202 3,090 Aug. 592 769 188 3,086 Sept. 624 H6 183 3,062 Cct. 589 703 196 3,036 Nov. 681 780 197 3,041 Dec. 572 881 192 3,040 
1918 
ran:- 569 . 915 212 3,040 Feb. 526 996 232 3,038 
"8r. 520 1,034 230 3,0,;.1 Apr. 6C9 1,076 234 3 , C&2 
:.!ay 489 1,125 239 3,042 June 436 l,237 f.46 3,043 July 458 l ,336 245 3,076 Aug. 448 l ,376 267 3,080 Sept 
Oct. 440 l ,4f3 277 3,079 Nov. 42e 1,42~ 303 
~.079 Dec. 427 1,436 31< 3,080 
1919 
Tan.' 416 l,451 327 3,080 Feb. 418 1,475 330 3,086 !!8.r, 421 1,466 368 3,084 
Apr. 403 l,51C 363 3,092 !lay 406 1,511 363 3,092 
June 369 1.,539 367 3,092 
July 446 1,538 360 3,095 
Aug. 387 1,534 363 2 ,989 
Sept. 397 l,501 372 2,944 
Cot. 397 l,467 367 2 ,905 
Nov, 393 1,458 356 2 ,872 
Dec, 436 l,362 386 2 ,833 
1920 
Tan.' 390 l ,36C 382 
. 2,787 _ 
Feb. 421 1,336 36b 2,762 
!'.Ar. 44.C l,290 369 2, 720 
Apr. 395 1,307 382 I 2 ,662 
""Y 369 l,2'Jl 390 2,646 June 408 1,207 391 2,663 
July 415 1,286 401 2 ,687 
Aug. 427 1,273 409 ~ ,695 
Sept· 423 l ,262 417 2 , 688 
Oct. 426 l,271 410 2 ,704 
Nov. 421 l,324 436 2, 739 
Deo. 41& 1,363 430 2, 761 
1921 
J'an.'" 366 1,461 433 2, 784 
Feb. 389 1,576 427 2,853 
UE>-r, :387 1,589 433 2, 916 
Arr. 395 1,607 425 3,001 
::a:, 4CO l,6C? 444 ~.CG9 
Juba 461 1,603 431 3,175 
July 339 1,691 416 3,223 
Aug. Z78 l, 757 383 3,228 
Sept. 386 1,778 :383 3,377 
Oct. 1 76 1,811 3'i9 3,453 
Nov. 373 1,851 394 3,5C4 
12) Includts reserve ctlmda ,:gainst ieeuee of 
UnitEd States Notes, and !lreaeury .:ates of 1890 
and the redemption funds held against Naticnal 
Bank llotes, Federal Reserve Notea and Feci.eral 
Reserve Bank Notes. 
(l) Exolusive of amounts held with the United 
States Treasurer in gold redemption fund against 
Federal Reserve Notes and. of gold held with 
foreign agencies but inclusive of balances in the 
gold aettlement f'und standing to the oredi t of 
:t"edernl Reserve B8.Ilke and agents. 
TABLE VI. 
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BANK CREDIT IN THE U!JI TED STATES 
1917-1921. 
{ ;tn milli~e of doJlare ; i 
- . ---,- .......... ., ......... .. .. .,. .... , 
Year F.ed . Ree . Earning Loans BJJd Notes aeaete and L!onth i n actual of Di scounts 
cir culation Fed. Ree. of 
llanke !lember banks 
in Fed. Ree. 
System. 
1917 
ru!°y 608 411 8,828 
Aug. 634 381 
Sept. 695 604 9 ,066 
Oct. 
~01 684 
:rrov . 858 1,052 9 , 561 
Dec. iL , 043 1 , 064 9 ,406 
1918 
Jim.' 1,227 1,029 
Feb. 1,21 0 1 , 031 
1.!ar . l , 320 1,201 9 ,153 
Apr, 1,431 1,286 
!!ay 1,626 1,301 9 ,272 
June 1,677 1,346 
July l, 711 1,564 9 ,633 
Aug . 1,855 1, 716 
Sept. 2 ,090 2 , 080 9 , 508 
oot. 2,366 2 , 295 
Nov. 2,531 2 , 312 10,114 
Dec. 2 ,607 2 , 318 
1919 
ran:- 2 , 631 2,177 9 ,931 
Feb, 2,443 2,339 
L!a.r. 2,475 2 , 336 9, 705 
Apr. 2 ,502 2,354 
!.lay. 2,521 2,402 9 ,917 
June 2 ,506 2,354 
July 2,494 2,482 10 , 689 
Aug . 2 ,503 2,448 
Sept. 2 ,561 2,503 11,101 
Cot . 2 ,669 2 ,824 
lJov. 2 ,736 3,024 11, 58 3 
Dec. 2 ,840 3,080 
1920 
:rs;;:· 2,987 3 , 039 11,803 
Feb. 2 , 844 :5 , 279 
;[ar. 2,999 3,lUl 12 , 014 
~ ·r. 3-.-~ 3 ,23£ 12,306 -L!ay 3 , 062 3,244 
June 3,101 3 , 183 
July 3 , 121 3 , 162 
J.ug . 3 , 108 3 , 289 
Sept. 3 , 202 3 , 309 
Cot, 3 , 278 3 , 396 
Nov. 3 , 347 3 , 303 
Dec. 3 , 320 3,263 
1921 
Jin:' 3,349 2 ,907 
Feb. 3,105 2 , 841 
r.:sr. 3,073 2 , 629 
Apr, 2 , 934 2,463 
May 2 , 880 2 ,249 
June 2 , 784 2 , 050 
July 1,919 
Aug . 1,757 
Sept. l, G66 
Oct, 1,662 
Nov . 1,459 
:tee, 1,536 
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APPENDIX C 
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TABLE I. HOLDINGS OF GOVERNt!E!IT PAPER BY FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANKS. 1917-1921 
( In thousands of dollars; 1.e .• 000 omitted l 
Year I Treasury Total U .s. Paper secured 
and Certificates Obligations by Month of Government Indebtedness Obligations 
1917 
!Jar." 48,000 104,902 Apr, 58, 971 118 ,644 
!lay 64,479 114,203 
June 6,834 66 ,361 July 
Aug. 7 ,066 77, ~34 Sept, 18 ,203 99 ,378 
Oct, 32 ,i25 114,224 
Nov. 15, 009 89 ,092 
Dec. 43,050 121,690 
1918 
Tan:- 46,223 130,599 
Feb. 100 ,887 181,446 
A!ar, 251,376 325,999 
A.pr. 18 ,431 78,241 
tlay 72, 929 146, 911 
June 194, 0~8 256,046 
July 3,053 56, 926 
Aug, 12 ,132 6(;,845 896, 333 Sept. 60 ,098 75, 643 1,221, 533 Oct. C32 ,060 350,311 l, 09£ ,417 Nov. 92, 664 121, 796 1,412,611 Dec. 282,677 311,546 1,400,371 
1919 
Tan:- 266,532 294, 784 1,367 ,671 
Feb. 156, 688 182, 782 1,667,966 
Ue.r . 173,797 2 0, 936 1,691,010 
Apr. 191, 601 218 ,636 l,760,672 
'!':e.y. 2Cl, BCO 229, Cl4 1,802,893 
June £04,104 231, 669 1,673,483 
July 212 I 028 239 ,402 1,616 ,210 
Aug. 243,411 270, 705 1,609,296 Sept. 261,081 278,315 l, 672, 503 
Oct. 274 ,326 301.~43 1,681, 082 
Nov. 288 ,032 314, 937 1,736,146 
Dec. 273,507 300,406 1,510,364 
1920 
Tan:- 276,421 303,521 I 1,467 ,892 
~·· 
~67 ,61..i.. ;....;.i.,.,.;..,, l., L7;.., ~uo 
r, 263,066 289, 921 l,441,016 
Apr. 266, 649 293,514 1,465,320 
L!ay 279 ,631 306, 394 1,447, 962 
June 3i::5 ,434 362 ,296 1,227 ,980 
July 298,520 325,380 1,241,017 
Aug. 273,601 300,580 1,314,830 
Sept. 270,623 297 ,600 1,220,423 
Oct. 269 ,434 296,371 1,203,906 
Nov. 293,6'76 320. 614 l, 192 ,426 
Lee. 261,263 288,191 l,141,036 
1921 
ran:- 261,452 287, 320 1,048,768 
Feb. 261, 510 287, 378 11003,976 
liar, 256,865 291, 731 1,010,373 
Apr. 242, 083 267, 792 920,637 
t:ay ZS0,129 305, 726 793, 961 
June 222, 783 257 ,442 647, 761 
July 215,313 239 ,488 591,216 
Aug. 196,225 230,233 546,176 
Sept. 187, 774 224,259 490,927 
Cct. 157, 739 19C, 946 461,886 
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